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THE TYRANNY OF THE MULTITUDE IS A
MULTIPLIED TYRANNY:1
IS THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE UNDERMINING
U.S. COMPETITIVENESS?
Elizabeth F. Brown2
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2006 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles Schumer sounded the
alarm that the United States was losing its competitive edge in the area of
financial services.3 A number of studies and academic articles completed in
the wake of this op-ed compared the market share and growth of the United
States in certain segments of financial services, particularly securities and
investment banking, with that of other nations.4 Some of these studies
1. Edmund Burke, Letter, Feb. 26, 1790.
2. Assistant Professor, The University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), BA, 1985,
The College of William and Mary, MA, 1987, The Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and JD, 1994, The University of Chicago Law School.
Research stipends from the University of St. Thomas School of Law were of assistance in the
preparation of this article. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Roberta
Karmel, Lisa Schiltz, Susan Stabile, the participants at the Seventh Annual Global Conference on
Business and Economics, at which a draft of this article was presented on Oct. 14, 2007, and the
participants at American Association of Law School’s Section on Securities Regulation meeting,
at which a draft of this article was presented on Jan. 4, 2008, and the research assistance of Martin
Norder.
3. Charles E. Schumer & Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2006, at A18. In this article, “financial services” refers to any of the
activities considered financial in nature pursuant to Section 103 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999 (GLBA), which include banking, securities, merchant banking, and insurance products
and services. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k) (2007). This definition of
financial services is not universally applied by other organizations. For example, the Basel II
Capital Accord excludes insurance activities from the definition of “financial activities” and
excludes insurance entities from the definition of “financial entities.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 7 n.5 (2004) [hereinafter
BASEL II CAPITAL ACCORD].
4. MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/SchumerWebsite/
pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter
MCKINSEY
REPORT]; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT (2006) [hereinafter COMM.
ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT]; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE
COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET (2007) [hereinafter COMM. ON
CAPITAL MKTS., COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT]; COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S.
CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2007) [hereinafter U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT];
RICHARD M. KOVACEVICH ET AL., FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S.
FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS (2007) [hereinafter FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE REPORT]; Chris
Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
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concluded that the previous lead of the United States was eroding and that
the trends indicated that it would continue to erode unless something was
done.5 These recommended a wide range of reforms to the current system.6
Among the recommended reforms was a call to consolidate financial
services regulators in the United States, perhaps going as far as creating a
single financial services regulator like the United Kingdom’s Financial
Services Authority (UK FSA).7
Not surprisingly, the conclusions of these studies generated a
significant amount of concern in the U.S. financial press and among U.S.
policymakers. The concern that the way in which the United States
regulates financial services might be undermining U.S. competitiveness
even played an influential role in the recently decided Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.8 In that case, Justice
Kennedy rejected the petitioners’ “scheme liability” concept of reliance.9
The Court was concerned that accepting the plaintiff’s theory would
undermine Congress’ specific intent to not provide for a private cause of
action against aiders and abettors.10 He worried that such an expansion
would have negative practical consequences because:
Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws could be
deterred from doing business here. This, in turn, may raise the cost of
(forthcoming 2008); Stephen J. Choi, Channeling Competition in the Global Securities Market
(Univ. Cal. Berkeley Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
111, 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=371700; John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing
Towards the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International
Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002); James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S.
Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157 (1992); Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV.
89 (2007); Peter Hostak et al., An Examination of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the
Attractiveness of U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Firms (Apr. 30, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956020); Donald C. Langevoort, The Social
Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007); Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1858 (2007); Eric J. Pan, Why the World No
Longer Puts its Stock in Us (Cardozo Sch. of Law Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies,
Working Paper No. 176, 2006), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=951705; Larry E. Ribstein,
Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 97 (2005).
5. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 7–29; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT,
supra note 4, at 1–22; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT, supra note 4,
at 1; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 4, at 146; FIN. SERVS.
ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7–15.
6. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 95–127; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 4, at 1–22; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 4, at
164–76; FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–15.
7. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 24–25; see U.K. FSA, What We Do,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
8. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 772 (2008).
9. Id. at 770. Under the scheme liability concept of reliance, “in an efficient market investors
rely not only upon the public statements relating to a security but also upon the transactions those
statements reflect.” Id.
10. Id. 771.
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being a publicly traded company under our law and shift securities
offerings away from domestic capital markets.11

The claim that the U.S. regulatory structure undermines U.S.
competitiveness appears at first blush to have some validity. Presumably if
a system or process aids competitiveness, others will copy it. The failure to
copy a particular process or system suggests that it is perhaps not
instrumental in enhancing the competitiveness of an entity, a market, or a
nation. While other nations have adopted laws and regulations similar to
U.S. financial regulations,12 no other nation has sought to copy the federal
and state regulatory structure that the United States uses to supervise and
regulate financial services. Currently, the United States has over 115 federal
and state agencies involved in regulating some aspect of financial services
and Congress is contemplating adding new agencies to the list.13
In fact, the rest of the world is moving in the other direction. As
illustrated in Table 1, fifty nations have consolidated their financial services
regulators, and sixteen nations, including the United Kingdom, Germany
and Japan, have created single financial services agencies.

11. Id. at 772 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion directly challenged
this view. He quoted with approval from the Brief for Former SEC Commissioners as Amici
Curiae that making those who violate § 10(b) liable for these violations “‘will not harm American
competitiveness; in fact, investor faith in the safety and integrity of our markets is their strength.
The fact that our markets are the safest in the world has helped make them the strongest in the
world.’” Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 1804–11.
13. Elizabeth Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a
Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 28–39 (2005). Bills have been
introduced into both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate to create an Office of
National Insurance within the U.S. Department of the Treasury to regulate insurance at the federal
level for the first time. See H.R. 3200, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2007); S. 40, 110th Cong., 2d Sess.
(2007).
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Table 1: Countries with Either an Integrated or SemiIntegrated Financial Services Agency14
Single Supervisor for Financial

Single

Services (Year Created)

Intermediaries
Banks

Agency
and

Supervising

Securities

Two

Types

Banks and Insurers

Firms

of

Financial
Securities
Firms and
Insurers

Austria (2002)

Dominican Republic

Australia

Bolivia

Bahrain (2002)

Finland

Belgium

Bulgaria

Cayman Islands

Luxembourg

Canada

Chile

(1997)

Mexico

Colombia

Egypt

Denmark (1988)

Switzerland

Ecuador

Jamaica

Estonia (2002)

Uruguay

El Salvador

Mauritius

Germany (2002)

Guatemala

Slovakia

Gibraltar (1991)

Kazakhstan

South

Hungary (2000)

Malaysia

Africa

Iceland (1999)

Peru

Ukraine

Ireland (2003)

Saudi Arabia

Japan (2000)

Venezuela

Kazakhstan (2004)
Latvia (2001)
Maldives (1999)
Malta (2002)
Nicaragua
Norway (1986)
Singapore (1984)
South Korea (1998)
Sweden (1991)
Taiwan (2004)
UAE
UK (1997)

The nations that adopted single regulators have found this approach to
have several significant advantages over the multiple regulators that they
previously had. First, the single regulator was better able to harmonize
regulations across sectors, eliminate duplicative regulations, and address
14. See José de Luna Martínez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated
Financial Sector Supervision 13 tbl.4 (World Bank Fin. Sector Operations & Policy Dep’t, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 3096, 2003); James R. Barth et al., A Cross-Country Analysis of
Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS &
INSTRUMENTS 67, 80 tbl.1 (2003); Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act,
2003 (Act No. 12/2003) (Ir.); Central Bank of Bahrain: Financial Sector Overview,
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gaps than were the multiple regulators.15 Second, the single regulator was
better situated to address the unique problems posed by financial
conglomerates that operate in and across multiple sectors.16 Third, the
single regulator was more cost-effective than the multiple ones.17 Finally,
the single regulator was better for consumers, because it provided a onestop shop for filing complaints against financial service providers and a
more uniform level of consumer protection.18
When discussing whether the United States is losing its competitive
edge relative to other nations in the area of financial services, commentators
are not always clear about what they mean by competitiveness. One way of
viewing competitiveness is to analyze the share of the global market for a
particular financial service or product captured by financial institutions
chartered or headquartered in the United States and compare how large it is
relative to the share captured by firms from other nations. This view is the
one that dominates many of the recent studies on the competitiveness of the
U.S. financial services. Concerns about the loss of this type of
competitiveness tend to be based on fears that it indicates a loss of national
power and prestige if U.S. firms no longer capture the largest share of a
particular financial market and on fears about the loss of jobs in particular
cities or regions within the United States.
http://www.cbb.gov.bh/cmsrule/index.jsp?action=article&ID=16 (last visited Jan. 16, 2008);
Bulgaria Financial Supervision Commission: About the Commission, http://www.fsc.bg/e_
fsc_page.asp?v=2 (last visited Jan. 18, 2008); Cayman Islands Monetary Authority: About Us,
Some Events in the History of the Cayman Islands, http://www.cimoney.com.ky/section/
aboutus/default.aspx?id=41 (last visited Jan. 18, 2008); Dominica to Set Up a Single Financial
Regulatory Body, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2003; Independent Financial Centre of the Americas,
http://www.ifcamericas.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2008); Finland Ministry of Finance: Stability
and Supervision http://www.vm.fi/vm/en/11_financial_market/05_stability_and_supervision/
index.jsp (last visited Jan. 18, 2008); Official Government of Gibraltar: Financial Services
Commission, http://www.gibraltar.gov.uk/bus/finservcomm.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2008);
Financial Services Commission of Jamaica: What We Do, http://www.fscjamaica.org/
content.php?action=content&id=61 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); CENTRAL BANK OF ICELAND,
ANNUAL REPORT 1999, 22 (2000), available at http://www.sedlabanki.is/uploads/files/
ark_99_3.pdf; INT’L MONETARY FUND, REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN: FINANCIAL SYSTEM
STABILITY ASSESSMENT—UPDATE INCLUDING REPORTS ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS
AND CODES ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS: BANKING SUPERVISION AND ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 7 (Aug. 2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04268.pdf; Latvia Financial and Capital Markets
Commission, http://www.fktk.lv/eng/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY
AGENCY, A CASE STUDY ON GLOBALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTION BUILDING IN THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR IN SAUDI ARABIA 12 (2004), available at http://www.sama.gov.sa/
en/news/2004-03/; About Finansinspektionen, http://www.fi.se/Templates/StartSectionPage_
842.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); Taiwan Combining Financial Regulators to Bring in
Investors, TAIWAN NEWS, July 1, 2004; South Africa Financial Services Board,
http://www.fsb.co.za/index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
15. See generally Brown, supra note 13 (discussing at length the advantages offered by a
single financial regulator over a regime that uses multiple regulators).
16. Id. at 39–46.
17. Id. at 59–67.
18. Id. at 52–59.
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This view of competitiveness places the competition by U.S. firms for
market share in the financial services markets within the broader context of
competition among nations. Nations compete in order to grow and develop.
They compete for markets, technology, skills and investment in order to
reduce poverty, increase living standards and create jobs.19 Governments
play a significant role in either fostering or hindering this competition.
Governments do this primarily by providing security, supporting the rule of
law, absorbing extraordinary risks, managing the macro-economy, and
either implicitly or explicitly implementing an industrial policy through a
series of microeconomic choices.20
Another way of viewing competitiveness examines whether the
financial markets within a nation foster competition among firms.
Economics views competitive markets as ones in which enough sellers and
buyers for particular goods or services exist such that each firm providing
the good or service is too small relative to the overall market to affect
prices. These firms must be able to enter or exit the market in response to
demand for a particular product or service. To the extent that financial
markets in the United States are not competitive in this way, investors or
customers are harmed because they may have access to a more limited
range of products or services that may be of a lower quality and for which
they must pay higher prices than if the financial services markets were
competitive. This view of competitiveness is less concerned with measuring
U.S. markets’ performance relative to the markets in other nations and is
more concerned with measuring how U.S. markets are performing against
the economic ideal of perfectly competitive markets. These very different
views of what “U.S. competitiveness” means can lead to significantly
different policy prescriptions.21
19. RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, HOW COUNTRIES COMPETE: STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2007).
20. Id.
21. For example, regulations that make it difficult for foreign insurance companies to enter the
U.S. insurance markets may help U.S. insurance companies to capture a larger share of the global
market for insurance, at least in the short term, because the United States market makes up such a
large percentage of the global market. Such regulations, however, would reduce the level of
competition within U.S. insurance markets and thus, harm consumers who would have a more
limited range of suppliers of insurance from which to choose. In the long run, however, other
nations may retaliate if the regulations seemed designed to protect U.S. firms and harm foreign
firms by making it harder for U.S. insurance companies to operate in their markets. If the
regulations are specifically aimed at harming foreign firms and arguably serve some other goal,
such as protecting consumers from firms that have engaged in fraud, it decreases the likelihood
that other nations will retaliate.
The importance of not undermining the amount of competition occurring within U.S.
domestic markets in order to aid certain U.S. firms is evident when one considers the growth in
financial assets held by U.S. households. The value of the total financial assets of U.S. households
more than tripled from $8.8 trillion in 1986 to $37.4 trillion in 2006. INS. INFO. INST., FINANCIAL
SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008 (2008), available at www.iii.org/financial2/banking/commercial
[hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008]. The mix of financial assets held by U.S.
households in banking, securities, and insurance products has not remained constant over this
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Enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. markets so that they more
closely approximate the economic ideal of perfectly competitive markets is
just one of the goals of financial regulation that should not be sacrificed in
order to enhance the competitive position and market shares of U.S. firms
in the global marketplace. Other essential goals that should not be sacrificed
include:
1) The Protection of the General Public: Regulations to promote
this goal generally are those that fully informed and fully
rational investors, depositors and insurance policy holders
would choose to protect themselves from problems like fraud.22
2) The Elimination of Negative Externalities from Financial
Failures: Regulations to promote this goal include prudential
regulations to ensure that financial services institutions are
solvent enough to meet their obligations to investors, depositors
and insurance policy holders.23
3) The Advancement of Various Equitable and Redistributive
Objectives: Regulations to promote this goal include ones like
banking regulations that encourage lending in certain markets
in order to foster economic development.24
4) The Promotion of Certain Aspects of Political Economy:
Regulations to promote this goal include restrictions on
commercial activities by financial holding companies.25
5) The Elimination of Crime and International Terrorism:
Regulations to promote this goal include anti-money laundering
controls.26
The United States government cannot support policies that enhance the
competitiveness and market shares of U.S. firms while undermining these
other goals. For example, completely deregulating financial services may
greatly increase the market share of U.S. securities firms in the short term
but it may lead to an increase in fraud on investors. Since almost 50% of
households in the United States now own securities, permitting an increase
in fraud may destroy the ability of these people to finance their retirements
or their children’s college educations.27 It could have a disastrous effect on

twenty-year period. For example, securities made up roughly the same percentage of U.S.
households’ financial assets in 1986 (31.6%) and in 2006 (35.8%) but in 1996 during the stock
market boom, securities made up 43.6% of the total financial assets of U.S. households. Id. Thus,
U.S. policymakers need to be concerned about creating and maintaining competitive markets in all
financial products and services.
22. Howell Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence
and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 258–59 (2007).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Brown, supra note 13, at 63–64.
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the U.S. economy in the long term. So competitiveness cannot be seen as
the sole Holy Grail of financial services regulation. It is an important goal
that may need to be balanced against the other goals of financial services
regulation.
This article examines what possible factors within the U.S. regulatory
structure for financial services may be harming the competitive position of
U.S. firms within the global markets. Section II examines how the U.S.
regulatory structure may affect both the share of global financial markets
captured by U.S. companies and the level of competition among financial
services firms within the United States. Section III examines some of the
available evidence regarding whether U.S. financial services firms are
losing market share to other nations, and to what extent any loss of market
share can be attributed to the U.S. regulatory structure. Given the breadth of
the markets for financial services, it will not be possible in this article to
examine in depth how U.S. financial services firms are doing in each
product and service market. Instead, this article will focus primarily on
those markets or firms about which prior studies have raised concerns.
Section IV draws some conclusions based on the available evidence and
makes some policy recommendations.
II. EFFECTS OF THE U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE ON
COMPETITIVENESS
The existing studies tend to blame the erosion of U.S. competitiveness
in the financial services arena primarily on two factors: overregulation and
the litigious environment in the United States.28 Both of these problems
deter foreign firms from entering or investing in the United States, and
encourage U.S. firms to minimize their exposure to U.S. markets. Both of
these factors can increase the costs of doing business for firms that choose
to or must operate within the United States, and these higher costs can
potentially put these firms at a competitive disadvantage to other firms not
saddled with these costs. Gaps in regulation or the absence of appropriate
regulation, however, also can undermine the competitiveness of the United
States by eroding the trust necessary to make the financial markets work
properly. The regulatory structure can be the root cause of all of these
problems.
A. REGULATION
In the area of financial services, government regulators promulgate
laws and regulations concerning the licensing and operations of banks,
securities firms, and insurance companies and their respective services and
28. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT, supra note 4, at 45–48; U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 4, at 6–10; MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 73–89;
FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–15.

2008] U.S. Financial Regulatory Structure & U.S. Competitiveness

377

products. While these regulations may encourage confidence that the
financial institutions and markets are trustworthy and encourage customers
and investors to buy their products and services, they may also make it
more difficult for new firms to enter the markets. This is particularly true if
the firms will be subject to duplicative and inconsistent regulations from
different regulatory agencies. Some firms may decide not to offer their
services in a particular nation if they determine that the costs involved with
satisfying these entry requirements outweigh the expected benefits of being
in that market. In addition, to the extent that regulations may limit the
ability of firms to exit a market if it proves less profitable than they hoped,
such regulations may deter a firm from entering in the first place if they are
not confident about their chances for success. This problem of inconsistent
and duplicative regulation is more likely to occur when multiple regulators
exist than when a single regulator is responsible for the financial services
industry.
The markets for banking, securities and insurance goods and services
are no longer distinct, but overlap in many areas today. For example, money
market accounts offered by securities firms compete with checking and
savings accounts offered by banks. In addition, hybrid products that
combine banking and securities attributes, securities and insurance
attributes, or banking and insurance attributes have become more prevalent
in recent years. Variable annuities, which combine life insurance features
with securities features, are one example of these hybrid instruments.
As a result of these changes in financial services, regulatory structures
that rely on multiple regulators, such as the United States, may overregulate
when compared to structures that use a single regulator because multiple
regulators produce overlapping and conflicting regulations.29 Burdensome
regulations can be a barrier to entry that decreases competition because the
compliance costs may make it unprofitable for some firms to enter the
market or to provide certain products.
1. Duplicative and Inconsistent Regulations
The United States has over 115 different state and federal agencies that
regulate some aspect of the financial services industry. Each of these
agencies generates regulations to govern its sphere of influence.
Unfortunately, these spheres of influence overlap.30 Banks and securities
29. On the other hand, multiple regulatory structures may produce more efficient and less
burdensome regulation than a single regulator if the multiple regulators engage in regulatory
competition. HELEN A. GARTEN, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
135–38 (2001) (describing the opposition to a single regulator because of a “preference for
federalism, fear of big government and faith in the power of regulatory competition”); Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359, 2360 (1998) (arguing that states should play a greater role in securities regulation because
of the benefits of regulatory competition).
30. Brown, supra note13, at 24–36.
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firms are regulated at both the federal and state levels. A nationally
chartered bank must comply with rules and regulations issued by the
Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). A state chartered bank
that is a member of the Federal Reserve system must comply with the rules
and regulations promulgated by Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the state
banking regulator that issued the bank’s charter. If a life insurance company
wants to operate in all fifty states, it must obtain a license from each state in
order to do business and a license for each of its products or services from
all fifty states, as well as comply with regulations issued by the SEC and the
state securities regulators governing any hybrid insurance/securities
products, like variable annuities. If a firm is a financial conglomerate
offering banking, securities, and insurance, it may have to comply with the
rules and regulations of a range of state and federal agencies, including the
Federal Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the SEC, the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC),
as well as the state banking, securities and insurance regulators. Thus,
financial services firms frequently find themselves having to comply with
duplicative regulations from different regulators. Numerous studies have
identified the problem of overlapping regulatory authorities producing
inconsistent regulations, including the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of Government (the Hoover Commission), which
recommended consolidating federal banking regulators as early as 1949,
and the 2004 U.S. General Accountability Office’s report on Financial
Regulation—Industry Changes Prompt Need to Reconsider U.S. Regulatory
Structure.31 Another study, on the effect of state insurance regulation on
insurance firms that operate in more than one state,32 found that the
duplicative nature of state regulations resulted in (1) “multiple state reviews
of product filings [that] are cumbersome and inefficient” and (2)
“significant delays in multi-state company licensing [] inhibit[ed] the ability

31. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503,
564 n.371 (2000); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 75–76 (Oct.
2004) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT].
32. Insurance companies must obtain a license from each state in which they do business and a
license for each of their products or services in each such state, as well as comply with regulations
issued by the SEC and the state securities regulators governing any hybrid insurance/securities
products, like variable annuities. Brown, supra note 13, at 24–36.
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of smaller companies to expand operations to the benefit of larger
companies with pre-established multi-state infrastructures.”33
Federal and state regulatory agencies have made some attempts to
eliminate duplicative and inconsistent regulations. For example, federal
banking regulators now jointly issue regulations and the OCC, OTS, and the
FDIC adopted a uniform application form for obtaining a charter and
federal deposit insurance.34 The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) has worked to set up a centralized system for filing
and approving insurance products to be provided in multiple states,
although its efforts have met with very limited success.35 Nevertheless, no
inter-agency forum currently exists in the United States in which all of the
state and federal financial services regulators can meet to share information,
assess risks that cross traditional regulatory sectors, and develop and
coordinate regulations to address risks.36 The lack of this type of forum is
particularly problematic when one considers that no recent financial crisis
affecting the United States fell within the jurisdiction of any single federal
or state financial services regulator.37
While federal and state regulators have made some attempts to
cooperate and coordinate activities, at other times they have spent
significant amounts of time and money fighting with each other over who
has the right to issue regulations or the final say over whether those

33. SHEILA BAIR, UNIV. MASS. ISENBERG SCH. MGMT., CONSUMER RAMIFICATIONS OF AN
OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER FOR LIFE INSURERS, at i–ii (2004), available at
http://www.isenberg.umass.edu/finopmgt/Faculty/Profiles/Sheila_Bair/.
34. Regulators Issue Common Form, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Aug. 2002, at
17.
35. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, INTERSTATE INSURANCE PRODUCT REGULATION COMPACT
(2003); NATIONAL TREATMENT & COORDINATION (EX) WORKING GROUP, NAIC DRAFT 2004
WORK PLAN (2004).
36. See generally Brown, supra note 13.
The existing inter-agency forums include the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC), the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets
(the President’s Working Group), the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure
Committee (FBIIC), the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, the North
American Securities Administrators Association, the Conference of State Banking
Supervisors (CSBS), and NAIC.
Id. at 29. FFIEC, the President’s Working Group, and FBIIC have the broadest range of
regulators. FFIEC consists of the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, the NCUA, the OCC, and the OTS.
The President’s Working Group consists of the heads of the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the CFTC,
and the Treasury. The FBIIC consists of representatives from the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC,
OTS, SEC, CFTC, NCUA, NAIC, CSBS, OFHEO, the Federal Housing Finance Board, the Office
of Homeland Security, and the Office of Cyberspace Security. Id. at 29–30. “None of these groups
currently has the authority, jurisdiction or resources to ensure the systematic sharing of
information between regulators in order to coordinate their activities and to assess the systemic
risks to the financial industry as a whole.” Id. at 30.
37. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 31, at 110.
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regulations apply to particular institutions.38 These battles, like the one
fought between the SEC and CFTC in the 1980s over who would regulate
securities futures, have been well documented.39 These turf wars continue to
this day. In response to the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation, the report of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets, and the McKinsey
Report, which all supported measures to reduce the role of states in
regulating national financial services firms as a means of reducing
overregulation of national firms, the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) issued a statement that it would
“continue to vigorously defend their authority to regulate at the state level”
and it would “remain vigilant in fighting” attempts to have federal
regulators preempt state regulatory authority.40
Given the inability of federal and state agencies to effectively cooperate
with one another, it is unlikely that a significant reduction in inconsistent or
duplicative regulations can be made in the United States without
consolidating some of the existing regulators. The experience of the United
Kingdom shows that such consolidation can be effective in reducing the
regulatory burden in a country: When the United Kingdom created its
Financial Services Authority by consolidating the prior self-regulatory
organizations and government agencies that dealt with financial services
into one entity, it was able to streamline the regulations under which UK
financial services firms operated. The UK FSA shortened the Code of
Market Conduct by 30%, reduced the listing rules for new securities by
38. See Brown, supra note 13, at 64–65; NASAA: State Securities Regulators Want Congress
to Ensure Their Authority, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 31, 2008).
39. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and
Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 319, 362 (2003).
40. NASAA: State Securities Regulators Want Congress to Ensure Their Authority, Sec. L.
Daily (BNA) (Jan. 31, 2008). The NASAA supports measures to strengthen cooperation between
state, federal and industry regulators. Id. The NASAA is a voluntary association of the securities
administrators in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands,
Canada, and Mexico. About NASAA, available at http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/. As a
result, it lacks any authority to make binding commitments on behalf of the state securities
regulators. Thus, any cooperation efforts between state and federal regulators require the
individual assent of each of the fifty states, which is not always easy to obtain. It is not clear what
NASAA’s vision of cooperation would entail. The NASAA and its members appear unwilling to
cede regulatory authority to any other regulator. For example, variable annuities are a hybrid
insurance-securities product, which is currently regulated by the state insurance regulators, the
state securities regulators and the SEC. The NASAA and its members have made it clear that they
do not want to allow the state insurance regulators to become the sole agencies permitted to
regulate these products. NASAA: State Securities Regulators Want Congress to Ensure Their
Authority, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 31, 2008). Instead, the NASAA and its members want to
retain their authority to bring enforcement actions and other measures against companies and
individuals who sell them. In this case, “cooperation” seems to mean that every agency simply
retains the right to regulate and bring enforcement actions and does not appear to contemplate any
reduction in the overlapping regulations or regulatory authority.
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40%, and “cut 200 pages from the provisions on collective investment
schemes.”41
2. Regulatory Costs
Financial services firms generally try to pass the cost of regulation on to
their clients, and those that cannot struggle to stay in business.42 Some
studies suggest that the high costs of the U.S. system make U.S. financial
services firms less competitive, because those costs either are passed along
to clients or borne by U.S. financial services firms.43 In head-to-head
comparisons with other nations, the U.S. regulatory regime appears to be
significantly more expensive than the regimes that employ a single financial
services regulator.44
The UK FSA publishes a chart in its annual report comparing its costs
with the costs of the financial services regulatory regimes in the United
States, Germany, France, Hong Kong, Ireland, and Singapore.45
Unfortunately, the UK FSA has not included all of the costs for the over
115 different state and federal agencies that regulate financial services in
the United States, nor has it been consistent with regard to which U.S.
agencies it does include.46 This means that the UK FSA report actually
41. HANDBOOK DEV. (Fin. Servs. Auth., U.K.), Dec. 2004, at 2, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/handbook/HB58.pdf.
42. See, e.g., STEVEN W. POTTIER, AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, STATE REGULATION OF
LIFE INSURERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND FINANCIAL STRENGTH 6 (2007),
available at http://www.acli.com/NR/rdonlyres/3A7453E3-FDF9-44DC-9A5B-66A41C949F97/
9195/PottierPackage3.pdf (providing a relevant study on insurance companies’ practices). For a
study regarding the securities industry, see OXERA CONSULTING LTD., THE COST OF CAPITAL: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 4 (2006), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/
rdonlyres/B032122B-B1DA-4E4A-B1C8-42D2FAE8 EB01/0/Costofcapital_full.pdf. This study,
for the London Stock Exchange, found that underwriting fees for a listing on one of the European
exchanges run between 3–4% on average, while underwriting fees for similar transactions in the
U.S. were 6.5–7% on average. Id. As a result, the IPO proceeds received by the listing companies
were at least 3% lower in the U.S. than in Europe. Id. Initial listing fees, legal, accounting and
advisory fees did not appear to be significantly different across markets, although professional
fees in New York tended to be higher than London, Frankfurt and Paris. The higher legal and
accounting fees were largely attributed to the costs of complying with the U.S. securities
regulations. Id.
43. Brown, supra note 4, at 67.
44. See OXERA CONSULTING LTD., supra note 42.
45. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04 app.5 at 99–103 (2004) [hereinafter FSA
ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04]; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05 app.5 at 111–14
(2005) [hereinafter FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05]; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT
2005/06 app.5 at 101–04 (2006) [hereinafter FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06].
46. For example, in 2002/03, 2003/04, the UK FSA included the budgets for the Office of
Thrift Supervision in the U.S. Department of Treasury and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) but left the budgets for these organizations out of the charts in later years. FIN.
SERVS. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03 app.8 at 205–10 (2003) [hereinafter FSA ANNUAL
REPORT 2002/03]; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04, supra note 45, app. 5 at 99–103; FSA
ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at 111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06,
supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04. As a result, the UK FSA numbers underestimate the regulatory
costs of the U.S. system. On July 30, 2007, the regulatory, risk assessment, enforcement, and
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underestimates the already high costs it reports for state and federal
regulation of financial services in the United States. The data collected by
the UK FSA for comparison with its 2002/03 fiscal year placed the total
annual regulatory costs incurred by the United States at approximately
twelve times the total annual regulatory costs for the UK FSA.47 The total
regulatory costs for the United States for 2002 would be more than sixteen
times the annual expenses of the UK FSA if all of the annual expenses for
the federal and state agencies that regulate financial services were
combined.48
The following table provides an idea of how much more expensive the
U.S. system is when compared with the UK FSA.
Table 2: Total Financial Service Regulatory Expenditures (in
millions of constant 2000 US dollars)49
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arbitration functions of the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) were consolidated
to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Actually achieving a single
rulebook for FINRA may take until 2009. Stephen Joyce, Securities: Consolidation of NASD,
NYSE Rules Could Take Until ‘09, FINRA’s Merrill Says, Banking Daily (BNA) (Oct. 26, 2007).
47. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 207. In each of its annual reports,
the UK FSA raised the following caveats regarding the comparability of the data collected: (1) the
figures do not necessarily relate to the same accounting period and may not have been compiled
on the same basis; (2) labor and other costs vary between countries; (3) variations in exchange
rates will affect the results expressed in a single currency; (4) the scope of the responsibility of the
regulatory authorities differ from one country to the next; and (5) the nature and scale of the
financial services industries in different countries differs materially. Id. at app.8 at 205–10; FSA
ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05,
supra note 45, app.5 at 111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04.
48. Brown, supra note 13, at 60–61.
49. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99; FSA ANNUAL REPORT
2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at 111; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at
101. To make the comparisons between the numbers provided in the 2003/04 chart and charts for
2004/05 and 2005/06, the amounts for the OTS and the NASD were subtracted from the total
regulatory costs listed for the United States for 2003/04. In addition, the total expenditures for
each country and the total GDP for each country were translated into constant 2000 US dollars to
eliminate the effects of inflation in each country.
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As the table illustrates, the United States spent at least 7.7 times more
than the United Kingdom and at least 35.1 times more than Germany to
regulate financial services in 2003. The ratios did not alter significantly
between 2003 and 2005. Even if one accounts for the differences in the
gross domestic product (GDP) of each country, the United States still
spends substantially more than the United Kingdom and Germany. In 2003,
the United States spent 28.9% more than the United Kingdom and 689%
more than Germany to regulate financial services after accounting for
GDP.50 Between 2003 and 2005, the gap between the United States and the
United Kingdom narrowed, although the gap between the United States and
Germany did not change much.51 In 2005, the United States spent 19.4%
more than the United Kingdom and 663% more than Germany to regulate
financial services.52 The gap between the United States and the United
Kingdom narrowed, in part, because the UK FSA assumed the
responsibility for regulating both mortgage and general insurance
intermediation for the first time in 2004/05.53
Table 3: Total Financial Service Regulatory Expenditures per
million dollars of GDP (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars)54
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50. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 205–10; FSA ANNUAL REPORT
2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at
111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04.
51. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 205–10; FSA ANNUAL REPORT
2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at
111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04.
52. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 205–10; FSA ANNUAL REPORT
2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at
111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04.
53. See FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, at 10–11.
54. FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2002/03, supra note 46, app.8 at 205–10; FSA ANNUAL REPORT
2003/04, supra note 45, app.5 at 99–103; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2004/05, supra note 45, app.5 at
111–14; FSA ANNUAL REPORT 2005/06, supra note 45, app.5 at 101–04.
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The lower regulatory costs imposed on financial services firms in other
nations provides a competitive advantage for those nations. The costs for
financial services in the United States generally are covered by the fees that
financial services firms pay to the state and federal regulators.55 As
previously noted, financial services firms attempt to pass these costs onto
their clients.
While the United States system is more expensive, it is not completely
clear how much the United States might save if it consolidated its
regulators. While useful in making clear how expensive the U.S. regime is,
the comparisons done to date on the regulatory costs spent by nations on
financial services have failed to account for a number of other significant
factors that may contribute to these cost differences. These factors include:
• Differences in composition and sophistication of the financial
services industry;
• Differences in regulatory objectives;
• Differences in resource endowments, like wages, capital costs
and education;
• Differences in enforcement intensity; and
• Differences in the degree to which the population respects the
law.
Unless these differences are accounted for, one cannot say with any
degree of certainty that switching from the U.S. regulatory model to the UK
FSA’s model will produce significant cost savings.
The states within the United States also use a range of regulatory
models from a separate regulator for each financial service to having all
financial services regulated by a single agency. An examination of the costs
associated with these state regulatory models would enable one to eliminate
or significantly reduce many of the differences that arise when comparing
national regimes. A preliminary examination of the costs of the state
regulatory regimes in the United States does not reveal that states which
employ a single financial services regulator spend significantly less than
those that use multiple regulators.56 This study therefore casts doubt on the
assertion that the United States could reduce its regulatory costs and thereby
potentially enhance the competitive positions of U.S. financial service firms
by moving to a single financial service regulatory model.

55. THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED
BANKING 2002-2003, at 36–38 (19th ed. 2003); NAIC, INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES
BOOK 27–32 (2006).
56. See Elizabeth F. Brown, A Preliminary Look at Regulatory Structures for Financial
Services (Univ. St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-42, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/asbtract=1008961.
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3. Regulatory Gaps
The structure of the financial markets is changing in the United States
and around the world. More products and institutions are being created that
do not neatly fit within the traditional categories of banking, insurance, and
securities. In addition, businesses and other entities increasingly rely on
capital markets for raising funds rather than borrowing them from
traditional commercial banks.57 This process of disintermediation is having
a profound impact on the financial services markets.58 In particular, it is
increasing the number and variety of entities that may create systemic risks
for the financial system.59 While no single, clear definition for systemic risk
exists, the common elements of the current definitions are that systemic risk
entails a triggering event that causes a chain of events resulting in negative
economic consequences to financial institutions or markets.60 These chains
of events are possible because banks and other financial institutions and
markets are so closely intertwined.61
Systemic risks are risks to the financial system.62 Market forces,
however, are not sufficient to encourage firms operating within the financial
system to reduce their systemic risk (and correspondingly their potential
profits) in order to maintain the stability of the financial system as a
whole.63 Professor Steven Schwarcz has characterized this problem as a
“type of tragedy of the commons.”64 As a result, some forms of financial
regulation are necessary in order to promote economic efficiency and force
firms to internalize the externalities to the financial system caused by their
risky behaviors.65 The fragmentary nature of the existing U.S. regulatory
structure, however, was not designed, nor is it able, to deal with the
problems posed by hybrid products and institutions and by the spread of
systemic risks to entities and markets outside of banking.
Attempts to deal with these hybrid products and institutions are often at
the root of many of the turf wars between the federal and state banking,
securities and insurance regulators. These wars often result in significant
regulatory gaps, which harm the industry, investors, and customers. The
current subprime mortgage crisis is simply the most recent example of state
and federal agencies allowing regulatory gaps to arise while they debated
who should regulate the various players that gave rise to the crisis.
57. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk 8–9 (Duke Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 163,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008326.
58. See id. at 8. Disintermediation means removing the intermediaries, like banks, from the
process of accessing capital. Id.
59. See id. at 8–11.
60. Id. at 4–15.
61. Id. at 8–11.
62. Id. at 18.
63. Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 15–17.
64. Id. at 17.
65. Id. at 15–17.
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The subprime mortgage crisis involves the following entities, among
others: the mortgage brokers who sold the loans, the banks who made the
loans, the international loan market that allowed loans to be traded like
stocks on an exchange, the special purpose vehicles created to buy the loans
from the banks, the investment banks that helped create the special purpose
vehicles and helped repackage the loans as securities, the credit rating
agencies, and the bond insurance firms that provided guarantees for
complex mortgage debt. Mortgage brokers were regulated in some states by
the state banking regulators, but in other states they were unregulated. As
noted above, the banks were regulated by the following banking regulators:
the state banking authority, OCC, FDIC, and the Federal Reserve. The
special purpose vehicles, the investment banks, and the credit rating
agencies were regulated by the SEC and the state securities regulators. The
SEC and the state regulators, however, subjected the credit rating agencies
to very little regulation. Finally, the bond insurance companies were
regulated by the state insurance regulators.66
The banking regulators do not appear to have considered the impact of
the loans once they were securitized and failed to catch and root out the soft
fraud perpetuated by some mortgage originators who disclosed misleading
and inaccurate information to the rating agencies.67 The securities regulators
did not consider how the loans underlying the securities were created and
did not appear to grasp that rating agencies had failed to adequately account
for the loosening underwriting standards when assigning ratings.68 The
insurance regulators failed to consider how potential regulatory failures by
the banking and securities regulators might harm insurance companies,
particularly the ones insuring the mortgage securities.69 In addition, the lack
of transparency in the financial markets for structured products meant that
neither investors nor regulators were aware of who precisely held the
subprime mortgage risk.70 Not surprisingly, federal and state regulators
were played off against each other by elements within the financial services
sector, such as the mortgage lenders, which claimed that they were policing
themselves and therefore, additional state or federal regulation was
unnecessary.71 In the end, the failure of the U.S. regulators to consider the
66. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, A Warning on Insurers Frays Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2008, at C1. William A. Ackerman, a manager of the Pershing Square hedge fund, issued a report
that predicted that MBIA and Ambac Financial Group, two bond insurance companies, might lose
up to $24 billion on mortgage investments that they guaranteed. Id. Those two companies
guarantee more than $1 trillion in municipal, corporate and mortgage debt. Id.
67. U.K. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FINANCIAL RISK OUTLOOK 2008, at 9 (2008).
68. Id. at 22.
69. Bajaj & Creswell, supra note 66.
70. Id.
71. Stephen Joyce, Mortgages: State Regulator Seeks Help to Police Mortgage Industry;
Lauds Frank Bill, NMLS, Banking Daily (BNA) (Dec. 4, 2007). North Carolina Bank
Commissioner Joseph Smith chided the mortgage industry for “trying to play rope-a-dope with
Congress and with the agencies” and accused it of failing to police itself. Id.
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entire series of transactions as a whole and to tailor regulations to the
systemic risks that these transactions could, and did, pose resulted in the
current crisis.
The subprime crisis has harmed the profitability of U.S. financial
institutions and weakened their ability to compete with those of other
nations. An alarming number of Americans are now facing foreclosure of
their homes as a result of this crisis while others are unable to obtain loans
due to the credit crunch brought on by the crisis. While deregulation or the
absence of regulation is frequently touted as a means of making markets
more competitive, in the case of the subprime crisis, the failure of the
multiple U.S. regulators to provide the appropriate level of regulation has
had the opposite effect.
Regulatory regimes that rely on an integrated regulator or a semiintegrated regulator theoretically should be better positioned to deal both
with hybrid products and institutions, and with the systemic risks posed by
entities other than traditional banks, than the multiple regulators employed
by the United States for the reasons suggested above. Of the eighteen
nations that the McKinsey Report classifies as “mature” financial markets
because of the level of capital markets penetration, fifteen of them either
have an integrated or a semi-integrated regulatory regime.72 The only ones
that do not are the United States, France, and Italy.73 Many, if not all, of the
fifteen nations that employ an integrated or a semi-integrated regulatory
regime deliberately adopted it in order to deal with the increasing number of
financial conglomerates and hybrid products.74 By failing to adopt a
regulatory structure that can deal with the new hybrid products and
institutions and the growing threat of systemic risks posed by entities other
than traditional banks, the United States may well place its financial
markets and firms at a competitive disadvantage with those of other
financially mature nations.
B. LITIGATION
Another reason often advanced for why the United States is losing its
competitive edge is the number and cost of the lawsuits brought against
financial institutions in the United States.75 The United States is perceived
as presenting corporations with a significantly more litigious environment
72. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 40. Capital markets penetration is defined as the
private debt and equity as a percentage of gross domestic product of a nation. It provides evidence
of the level of disintermediation occurring within a nation. Banking traditionally is the bedrock for
the financial services industry in most countries with securities and insurance playing subordinate
roles to it. As financial markets mature, businesses become increasingly willing and able to bypass
banks and other financial intermediaries in order to obtain financing directly through the capital
markets.
73. Id.
74. Martínez & Rose, supra note 14.
75. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 16–17.
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than any other country in the world. This is due in part to the relative ease
with which one can bring a class action lawsuit in the United States and in
part to the enforcement efforts by state and federal financial services
regulators.
1. Private Class Actions
Private litigation in the United States imposes significant monetary
sanctions on financial services firms operating within the United States.76
During the 2002–2004 period, an average of almost $3.5 billion per year of
private monetary sanctions were imposed on firms and individuals in the
U.S. securities markets.77 Most of this amount was due to settlements of
class action lawsuits, although $160 million of it was from NASD
arbitrational awards.78
Traditionally, private litigation seeking to enforce the financial services
regulations was a unique feature of the United States, as such actions were
negligible in other jurisdictions.79 This difference was due in part to the fact
that other jurisdictions either do not permit private class action lawsuits to
be brought or had rules that discourage lawsuits that have a marginal chance
of success. For example, the United Kingdom discourages frivolous or
weak suits by employing a “loser pays” rule under which the losing party in
a suit must not only cover his own attorneys’ fees but must pay those of the
winning side as well.80
The differences between the U.S. regime and those of other nations may
decrease in the future for two reasons. First, European countries are making
it easier to bring class action-style law suits in the form of “group litigation”
or “representative actions or proceedings.”81 In the United Kingdom,
representative actions have been available for two centuries but were rarely
used due to narrow court interpretations, but they are now being used more
frequently where declaratory or injunctive relief is sought.82 In addition, the
European Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers, which
was passed into law in 2000, permits group litigation.83 Although the
directive focuses on injunctions, damages may be sought in some
countries.84 In addition, several countries, including the United Kingdom,

76.
77.
78.
79.

See Jackson, supra note 22, at 280–81.
Id.
Id. at 281.
Linda A. Willett, U.S.-Style Class Actions in Europe: A Growing Threat?, BRIEFLY (Nat’l
Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest, Washington, D.C.), June 2005, at 6.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Willett, supra note 79, at 7; Council Directive 98/27/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31998L0027:EN:NOT.
84. Willett, supra note 79, at 7.
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the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, have adopted laws that
permit class-action types of litigation.85
Second, while securities class actions have fluctuated over the years,
they may be occurring less frequently in the United States. This seems more
likely to be true if one excludes actions that are likely to be due to shortterm phenomena, such as the options backdating and the subprime crisis.86
Over the past decade securities class actions have averaged about 194 per
year.87 Between 2005 and 2007 securities class actions, excluding those
relating to options backdating and the subprime crisis, declined by over
28% from 176 to 126.88
Table 4: Number of Securities Class Actions89

85. Id. at 8.
86. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS 2007: A YEAR

IN

REVIEW 5 (2008).
87. Id.
88. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 86, at 5; Joseph A. Grundfest, The Class-Action
Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A15.
89. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 86, at 5.
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One explanation for this decline is that there has been less fraud as a
result of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and tougher SEC and
Justice Department enforcement actions.90 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
conducted over 5,428 interviews of chief executive officers, chief financial
officers, and other executives concerning crime prevention and detection in
their companies.91 This survey found that accounting fraud in the United
States declined from 36% in 2005 to 13% in 2007.92 In addition, over 70%
of U.S. respondents found that the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements had been
at least marginally effective in detecting economic crime.93
2. Government Enforcement Efforts
Even if the difference between the threat of private litigation in the
United States and the rest of the world declines, financial services firms will
continue to view the threat of governmental legal action against them as
being higher in the United States because of the enforcement actions of the
state and federal regulators. Each of the over 115 regulators in the United
States has the power to bring enforcement actions against the firms that it
regulates. Depending on the regulatory agency, these enforcement actions
can be for either criminal or civil penalties.
In addition, once one agency decides to bring an enforcement action, it
is not uncommon for other state or federal agencies to bring additional
actions against the same alleged violator. In fact, actions by government
regulators and self-regulatory organizations make up the vast majority of
the enforcement actions faced by financial services firms. For example,
during the period from 2002–2004, class action lawsuits made up just 3.3%
of the securities regulations enforcement actions brought, while the SEC,
the Department of Justice, state agencies, the NASD and the NYSE brought
the remaining 96.7% of the actions.94 The sanctions imposed by these
actions were substantial. Monetary sanctions averaged over $5.3 billion per
year.95 At the federal level, approximately 4,200 months of prison time plus

90. Grundfest, supra note 88.
91. Crime: Study Says Economic Crimes Occurring in Nearly 50 Percent of Global
Companies, Corp. L. Daily (BNA) (Oct. 18, 2007).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Jackson, supra note 22, at 280. Government enforcement actions also have spurred some
class action lawyers to bring suits against the same alleged violator. It is unclear how these
additional lawsuits can be justified from the perspective of further deterring corporations or the
people who work for them from engaging in fraud or violations of the financial services. Stephen
Joyce, International Developments: Global Regulators Disagree On Effective Enforcement Tools,
Practices, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/
sld.nsf/eh/A0B5U3H6U0.
95. Jackson, supra note 22, at 279, 280 tbl.3.
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over 1,500 months of probation per year were imposed on average during
the 2002–2004 period.96
If one compares the level of public enforcement actions against
financial services firms in the United States with those in other nations with
roughly similar laws and levels of economic development, one finds that
the intensity of U.S. enforcement efforts is higher than that of most other
jurisdictions, even after accounting for differences in the size of the
domestic markets.97 For example, in the area of securities enforcement, the
state and federal securities regulators in the United States brought an
average of 224 actions per trillion dollars of stock market capitalization
during the 2002–2004 period.98 By contrast, the UK FSA averaged only
twenty-five actions per trillion dollars of stock market capitalization, and
the German BaFin brought ninety actions per trillion dollars of stock market
capitalization.99
The sanctions imposed by U.S. authorities also appear to be
significantly higher than those imposed by the regulators of other nations.
In the 2002–2004 period, U.S. securities regulators imposed monetary
sanctions averaging $326 million per trillion dollars of stock market
capitalization while the UK FSA only imposed an average of $9 million per
trillion dollars of stock market capitalization.100 While Germany’s BaFin
did not provide comparable data, anecdotal evidence suggests that
Germany’s BaFin imposed even lower amounts of monetary sanctions than
the UK FSA imposed.101
Thus, the U.S. regulatory structure imposes higher costs on U.S.
financial firms, which may be a drag on their competitiveness in global
markets. The U.S. regulatory structure also may fail to foster the
appropriate level of competition among firms within the United States by
creating barriers to entry in the form of regulation and litigation.

96. Id. at 279 (“Comparable data on state criminal sentences and probation [was] not
available.”).
97. Id. at 281–83.
98. Id. at 282. Of the ninety actions per trillion dollars of stock market capitalization brought
by the German BaFin, over half concerned voting rights issues, which would be considered a state
corporate law issue in the United States, not a violation of the securities laws. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Jackson, supra note 22, at 282. The figures for the United States and the United Kingdom
only represent monetary sanctions imposed by the governmental authorities and do not include
amounts from private securities litigation, which comprise over a third of the monetary penalties
imposed on U.S. securities markets and which is negligible in the United Kingdom and Germany.
Id.
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III. EVIDENCE THAT U.S. FIRMS ARE LOSING GLOBAL
MARKET SHARE
The recent studies by McKinsey, the Financial Services Roundtable, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital
Markets in the 21st Century, and the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation all provide empirical evidence, which they claim illustrates that
the U.S. is losing its competitive edge.102 These studies almost exclusively
focused on U.S. competitiveness in the area of securities and investment
banking. As evidence of loss of competitiveness, these studies primarily
examined the loss of market share in terms of IPOs, the increased
willingness of U.S. companies to list abroad, the delisting of foreign
corporations from U.S. exchanges, and the decline in cross-listing
premiums.
If one is going to assess the competitive standing of the United States in
the area of financial services, one needs, however, to look at the broader
market for financial services. Financial services cover a much larger
spectrum of products than companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges.
Financial services include banking and insurance products and firms, as
well as securities and investment banking. In 2005, the GDP from financial
services in the United States totaled $957.7 billion or about 8% of U.S.
GDP.103 Of that amount, the securities industry only comprised 17.5%,
while the remainder came from banking and insurance.104
While the securities industry clearly is important to New York, it plays
a less important role in most other states. The McKinsey Report noted that
Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina and South Dakota all employ major
portions of their workforces in the financial services industry.105 What the
McKinsey Report failed to mention is that the securities industry is not
crucial to any of those states, except Connecticut. While 45% of New
York’s GDP from financial services and 22.6% of Connecticut’s GDP from
financial services are due to the securities industry, the percentage of the
state GDP from financial services that is due to securities is only 3.1% in
Delaware, 4.5% in North Carolina and 1.6% of South Dakota.106 In order to

102. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 39–89; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 4, at 23–50; COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 6–29; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM’N REPORT supra note 4, at 15–48;
FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 39–40. These studies differ concerning the
time periods used to compare U.S. market share of capital markets, how markets and market share
are defined, and what factors affecting market share are considered.
103. See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts, Gross Domestic
Product by State, Gross Domestic Product for all U.S. States and Regions, Finance and Insurance
and Securities, commodity contracts, investments, 1997-2006 (2007), available at
http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp.
104. Id.
105. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
106. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, supra note 103.
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make a more accurate assessment of whether U.S. financial services firms
are losing market share to the financial services firms of other nations, a
broad examination of financial markets and firms is undertaken below.
A. MARKETS SHOWING EVIDENCE OF LOSS OF MARKET SHARE BY
U.S. FIRMS
1. Securities Markets
a. Domestic Market Capitalization
While the United States’ share of global market capitalization has
fluctuated over the past twenty-five years, it has tended to decline over
time. The United States’ share of the total global capitalization has risen
and fallen as financial crises rocked the developing world and recessions
adversely affected the U.S. markets. In 1983, the United States’ market
capitalization of its equities represented 56.0% of the total global market
capitalization.107 The United States’ share of total global market
capitalization dropped to 34.7% during the 1994 recession in the United
States.108 Then a series of financial crises in developing countries combined
with the resurgence of the United States economy led to the longest stock
market expansion in U.S. history. The Mexican peso crisis (1994–1995),
the Asian financial crisis, and the Russian financial crisis (1998–1999)
produced a “flight to quality,” as both western investors and local investors
pulled their funds out of Asia, central and eastern Europe, and Latin
America and reinvested them in more stable, developed markets, such as
the United States. The share of total global market capitalization of stock
exchanges in developed countries was only 82.3% by the end of 1992.109
After the Mexican peso crisis, the developed nations’ share rose to 86.5%
by the end of 1995.
After the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian financial crisis
in 1998–1999, the developed nations’ share of total global market
capitalization averaged about 90.2% for the period 1997–2001.110 By 1999,
at the height of the dotcom bubble, the United States’ market capitalization
had risen to 47.8% of the total global capitalization as tracked by the World
Federation of Exchanges.111 When the dotcom bubble burst and a recession
107. Maria K. Boutchkova & William L. Megginson, Privatization and the Rise of Global
Capital Markets, FIN. MGMT., Winter 2000, at 31, 36 tbl.II. These numbers are as tracked by the
World Federation of Exchanges.
108. Id.
109. World Federation of Stock Exchanges, Statistics/Time Series/1990-2006, available at
http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/Ts2%20Market%20cap..pdf.
110. Id.
111. Id. The actual U.S. market share is even less because the World Federation of Exchanges
only tracks the market capitalization of its members. It does not have data for certain exchanges of
growing importance, such as Russian exchanges like the Russian Trading System Stock Exchange
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in the United States followed, the developed nations’ share dropped to
86.4% in 2002.112 The developed nations’ share has declined every year
since 2002 even as the stock markets in these nations recovered and was
only 78.0% in 2006.113 By 2006, the United States’ market capitalization
was down to 37.4% of the total global market capitalization.114
While the developed world as a whole has lost market share to the
emerging markets, the United States lost market share to other developed
markets from 2001 to 2006, as illustrated in the table below.115 Despite the
warnings in the McKinsey Report and others, the United States does not
appear to have lost market share to London between 2000 and 2006.
London’s market share remains relatively constant between 2000 and 2006.
Nevertheless, the United States does appear to be losing market share to the
smaller developed countries like Spain and Australia and to the resurgence
in the Japanese stock markets during this period.116
Table 5: Domestic Market Capitalization as a Percentage of
Developed Markets’ Capitalization117
Countries
USA
LSE
Euronext
Japan
Spain
Australia

2000
54.3
9.3
8.1
11.3
1.8
1.3

2001
57.6
9.0
7.9
9.4
1.9
1.6

2002
56.0
9.4
7.8
10.5
2.3
1.9

2003
53.9
9.3
7.8
11.2
2.7
2.2

2004
52.7
9.2
7.9
11.5
3.0
2.5

2005
51.1
9.0
7.9
13.9
2.8
2.4

2006
48.6
9.4
9.2
11.9
3.3
2.7

(RTS). The members of the World Federation of Exchanges include American Stock Exchange,
Amman Stock Exchange, Athens Exchange, Australian Securities Exchange, Bermuda Stock
Exchange, BME Spanish Exchanges, Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, Bolsa de Comercio de
Santiago, Bolsa de Valores de Colombia, Bolsa de Valores de Lima, Bolsa de Valores do Sao
Paulo-BVSP, Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd., Borsa Italiana SPA,
Bourse de Luxembourg, Bourse de Montreal, Budapest Stock Exchange Ltd., Bursa Malaysia,
Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchanges, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Colombo Stock
Exchange, Cyprus Stock Exchange, Deutsche Börse AG, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing,
Indonesia Stock Exchange, International Securities Exchange, Irish Stock Exchange, Istanbul
Stock Exchange, Jasdaq Securities Exchange, Inc., JSE Limited, Korea Exchange, Ljubljana Stock
Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Malta Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stock Market, National Stock
Exchange of India Limited, New Zealand Exchange Ltd., NYSE Euronext, OMX Nordic
Exchange, Osaka Securities Exchange, Oslo Børs, Philippine Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock
Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Singapore Exchange, Stock Exchange of Mauritius, Stock
Exchange of Tehran, Stock Exchange of Thailand, SWX Swiss Exchange, Taiwan Stock
Exchange Corp., Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange Group, Inc., TSX Group,
Warsaw Stock Exchange, and Wiener Borse AG. World Federation of Exchanges, Members,
http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&menu=54.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. World Federation of Stock Exchanges, supra note 109.
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b. Market Share of IPOs
The McKinsey Report and some of the other reports have focused on
the fact that in 2006 and 2007, China eclipsed the United States in terms of
total capital raised through IPOs and that in 2007 China eclipsed the United
States in terms of the number of IPOs as evidence that the United States has
lost its competitive edge.118 Until 2005, the United States was the numberone country in terms of total capital raised in IPOs with $33 billion in 2005,
representing almost 20% of the total capital raised that year.119 The United
States was the number-one country in terms of the number of IPOs
conducted in 2006 with 187 listings compared with China’s 175 listings.120
China, however, raised $56.6 billion in 2006 (over 23% of the total capital
raised worldwide through IPOs) compared with $34.1 billion in the United
States.121 In 2007, China raised over $52.6 billion in the first eleven months
of 2007 (over 20% of the total capital raised worldwide through IPOs)
compared with $38.6 billion in the United States.122 In addition, China had
the largest number of IPOs with 209 in 2007 (over 12% of the total number
of IPOs worldwide in 2007) compared with 179 IPOs in the United
States.123
Many of these firms that did not elect to go public in the United States
may have found U.S. markets less receptive because they could not meet
the disclosure requirements under U.S. law or because they were not very
good investments. Some companies clearly are choosing the London Stock
Exchange because of its weaker disclosure and listing requirements. IPOs
by Russian companies, in particular, were (until recently) choosing to list in
London because of its weak regulatory environment.124 Another example of
118. Press Release, Ernst & Young, Emerging Markets Fuel Record Global IPO Activity in
2006 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/International/Media__Press_Release_-_IPO_Survey_Year_End_2006 [hereinafter Ernst & Young, Emerging Markets
Press Release]; Press Release, Ernst & Young, Accelerated Globalization Drives Record-Setting
World IPO Markets (June 22, 2007), available at http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/
International/Media_-_Press_Release_-_IPO_Trends_Report_2007 [hereinafter Ernst & Young,
Accelerated Globalization Press Release]; Press Release, Ernst & Young, Global IPO Activity
Reaches Record Levels in 2007 (Dec. 17, 2007), available at http://www.ey.com/global/
content.nsf/International/Media_-_Press_Release_-Year_End_IPO_Activity [hereinafter Ernst &
Young, Global IPO Activity Press Release].
119. Ernst & Young, Accelerated Globalization Press Release, supra note 118.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ernst & Young, Global IPO Activity Press Release supra note 118.
123. Id.
124. Dmitry Dokuchayev, Russia’s IPO Record, MOSCOW NEWS WKLY., Dec. 13, 2007,
http://mnweekly.ru/business/20071213/55296456.html. Investors fled the Russian markets in the
wake of the 1998 financial crisis and have been slowly returning in recent years. Id. Russian IPOs
have been migrating back to Russian exchanges as investors become more willing to invest in
Russia’s domestic exchanges and as the Russian Federal Service for Financial Markets has
undertaken reforms to improve the domestic markets. In 2005, 94% of all Russian IPOs were
listed in London. Id. In 2006, the percentage of Russian IPOs listed in London dropped to 61%
and it declined to 57% in 2007. Id. In 2006, only 28% of Russian offerings were corporate
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a firm that elected to list in London because of its more lax disclosure and
listing requirements was PartyGaming, an online casino operator, which
listed on LSE in 2005.125 The IPO for PartyGaming raised $1.9 billion, all
of which went to its founders, an American couple who live in Gibraltar.126
The company used computers located on Native American lands, and 90%
of its revenues came from U.S. residents despite the fact that online
gambling was and is illegal for U.S. residents.127 The prospectus disclosed
that the directors relied on the inability or unwillingness of U.S. officials to
enforce the laws against online gambling.128 On October 13, 2006, the
United States banned money transfers to offshore online gambling firms
and the share price of PartyGaming plunged.129 Such a company would not
have been able to list on the U.S. exchanges because the SEC would not
have considered its risk disclosures adequate. In the wake of criticisms
about the laxity of its regulatory environment, the London regulators have
tightened listing requirements within the past year.130 As a result, some
Russian corporations are now searching for a new exchange with looser
legal procedures and financial reporting requirements than the London
Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM).131
c. Market Share of Global IPOs
In 2000, the United States hosted nine out of the ten largest IPOs in the
world.132 In 2005 and 2006, the United States only hosted one of the
twenty-five largest IPOs in the world.133 This decline is not necessarily
solely due to a decrease in U.S. competitiveness. Many factors affect a
corporation’s decision regarding where to list its securities.
Geography is a major factor. The vast majority of corporations list their
securities in their home markets. In 2006, 90% of corporations chose to list
their shares in their home countries.134 The corporations that undertook
almost all of the twenty largest IPOs decided to go public in their native
offerings, not shareholder offerings, which meant that the money went to the corporations for
investment in the business rather than to the shareholders. Id. In 2007, however, 86% of the
offerings by Russian companies were corporate offerings. Id.
125. David Henry, London’s Freewheeling Exchange, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 27, 2006, at 40.
126. Id. Normally, in a U.S. listing, the founders would receive 15% or less of the funds raised
from an initial public offering. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Deutsche Boerse Is Strengthening Position in Russia, GAZETA.KZ (Kaz.), Dec. 21, 2007,
http://eng.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=101981.
131. Id.
132. Pan, supra note 4, at 2.
133. America’s Capital Markets: Maintaining Our Lead in the 21st Century: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 109th Cong. 12 (2006) (testimony of Marshall Carter, Chairman,
NYSE Group, Inc.).
134. Ernst & Young, Accelerated Globalization Press Release, supra note 118.
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countries.135 Improvements in local liquidity and international investor
willingness to invest in companies listed outside of the major exchanges
have facilitated these listings.136
In recent years, the corporations in emerging markets, particularly
Brazil, Russia, India and China, were responsible for the largest IPOs. In
2007, fourteen out of the twenty largest IPOs were by emerging-market
corporations, up from nine out of the twenty largest IPOs in 2006.137 IPOs
for Russian and Chinese companies were responsible for almost half of the
value of the top twenty IPOs in 2006.138 In 2007 China had more IPOs,
which raised more money than Russia, Brazil and India combined.139
In addition, the types of companies bringing the largest IPOs in the late
1990s and in 2000 were technology and financial services corporations
based in the United States. More recently, para-statal corporations that
emerging-market governments are taking public have represented the
largest IPOs. For political reasons, these entities are not going to be listed in
their home jurisdictions. For example, in recent years most Chinese
corporations were forced to pick an exchange for their IPOs based on
political or other non-economic considerations because they were
government controlled.140 It would have been politically unpalatable for the
Chinese government to conduct their IPOs in the United States.141 As a
result, the Chinese companies with the largest IPOs in 2005 and 2006 used
one of the Chinese markets.142 These factors that draw market share of
global IPOs away from the United States suggest that there are other factors
at work out of U.S. regulators’ and legislators’ control.
These listings are not necessarily beneficial for the companies involved.
In 2007 in China, forty-one companies have listed their shares on both the
Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets.143 These shares trade at vastly
different prices due to the Chinese restrictions on stock ownership. For
example, China CITIC Bank had an IPO in April 2007. After the first day
of trading, its shares were worth eleven Yuan (approximately HK$10.68)
on the Shanghai stock exchange and were worth HK$ 6.68 on the Hong
Kong stock exchange.144
In addition, it is important to note that while the Chinese stock markets
may look like stock markets elsewhere, they do not operate under the
normal economic rules. China tightly controls its stock markets and places
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Ernst & Young, Global IPO Activity Press Release, supra note 118.
Ernst & Young, Accelerated Globalization Press Release, supra note 118.
Ernst & Young, Global IPO Activity Press Release, supra note 118.
Ernst & Young, Accelerated Globalization Press Release, supra note 118.
Ernst & Young, Global IPO Activity Press Release, supra note 118.
See Thomas Easton, Flashing Red, THE ECONOMIST—THE WORLD IN 2008, at 53 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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restrictions on the ability of foreigners to invest in companies listed on the
Shanghai stock exchange, and places limitations on the ability of mainland
Chinese nationals to invest in companies listed abroad or even on the Hong
Kong stock exchange.145 Chinese nationals, thus, are forced to choose
between investing their money in savings accounts that pay less than
inflation, real estate with questionable property rights, or shares listed on
the Chinese stock exchanges.146 Investors buying shares in Chinese
corporations are not receiving the same sort of investment that they would
receive if they were able to purchase shares in an American corporation.
Shares in Chinese corporations are not equivalent to shares in U.S.
corporations because they do not give the buyers real ownership rights,
such as the ability to determine management of the corporation, which is
frequently determined by the Chinese central government, or dividend
rights.147 In addition, investors in China do not enjoy the types of
protections, particularly regarding disclosure of material corporate
information, afforded investors in the United States or London.148 Chinese
corporations and the investment banks that work with them disclose
information to selected investors but not to the market as a whole.149 Stock
prices on the Chinese stock exchanges do not, therefore, accurately reflect
the corporations’ valuation. The shares of major benchmark companies in
China also are predominately held by the corporation or the government,
which do not trade them.150 The prices listed on the exchanges are,
therefore, based on a very small volume of shares traded back and forth.151
These factors combined with the large amount of funds flooding the
Chinese stock exchanges from local investors mean that the stock prices on
these exchanges are extremely out of step with reality. On the Shanghai
exchange in October 2007 stock prices were sixty-five times earnings while
on the Shenzhen exchange the stock prices were seventy-five times
earnings.152
d. Market Growth Rates
The McKinsey Report concluded that strong growth outside of the
United States in capital markets revenue would erode the United States’
position.153 The median growth rate for capital markets revenue is about
20% in the European Union and 17% in Japan compared with 7% in the

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Easton, supra note 140.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Easton, supra note 140.
MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 40–41.
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United States.154 The major indexes in the United Kingdom, Germany and
Japan were outperforming the major U.S. indexes, such as the Standard and
Poor’s 500, the Dow Jones Industrials, and the Nasdaq Composite over the
past three years.
The weakness of the U.S. dollar has also made investing overseas more
attractive. The euro is now significantly stronger than the dollar in currency
markets.155 The euro has become an alternative reserve currency to the U.S.
dollar for many investors. The euro could replace the U.S. dollar as the
primary reserve currency within the next twenty years if all members of the
European Union adopted the euro or if the current depreciation trend of the
U.S. dollar persists into the future.156
As a result, the compound annual growth rates for these exchanges are
distorted. Both the Shanghai and the Shenzhen exchanges are members of
the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE). These market distortions for
both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges also affect the 24.9%
compound annual growth rate for the other member exchanges of the WFE
for 2002–2007 cited by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation.157
The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation cited this growth rate as a
cause for concern because the average compound annual growth for the
U.S. public exchanges for 2002–2007 was only 11.4%.158 This comparison,
however, is something of an apples-and-oranges comparison because the
other WFE exchanges, particularly the Chinese exchanges, do not operate
under the same economic rules under which the U.S. public exchanges
operate.
It is important to note that the decline of the U.S. dollar relative to other
currencies, particularly the euro and the British pound, affects the accuracy
of the growth rate comparisons. The Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation cited as a source of concern as regards U.S. competitiveness the
fact that the London Stock Exchange had an average compound annual
growth rate of 18.2% for the period from 2002 to 2007.159 It is not clear,
however, that the Committee accounted for the distortions that the decline
of the U.S. dollar has on these growth rates. For example, between 2005
and 2006, the New York Stock Exchange grew 13.1% and the London
154. Id.
155. As of December 28, 2007, the euro-U.S. dollar exchange rate was €1 = US$ 1.4716. Min
Zeng, Dollar Posts Biggest Weekly Decline Since April 2006 on Housing, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28,
2007), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ady9KnpH9Ahs&
refer=home.
156. Chinn Menzie & Jeffrey Frankel, Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as the
Leading International Reserve Currency? (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11,510, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11510.pdf?new_window=1; Euro Could
Replace Dollar as Top Currency—Greenspan, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSL1771147920070917.
157. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS., COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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Stock Exchange grew 24.1% in U.S. dollars.160 Most of the London Stock
Exchange’s growth, however, was due to the declining value of the U.S.
dollar. In British pounds, the London Stock Exchange’s growth was only
8.8% between 2005 and 2006.161
In addition, as foreign markets have outperformed the U.S. stock
markets, U.S. investors have become more willing to invest in securities
traded in overseas markets than they were before the adoption of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Six years ago eight cents out of every new
dollar invested was invested overseas.162 Today around seventy-seven cents
out of every new dollar invested is invested in international markets.163 In
addition, globalization has made more Americans aware of foreign
companies and their products. Technology also has made it easier to list and
trade securities outside of the United States.164
e. U.S. Companies Listing Outside of the United States
A new development in the past few years is the willingness of U.S.
firms to list on an exchange outside of the United States. The primary
beneficiary of these listings has been AIM, where over forty-four U.S.
companies have listed. Several factors have affected the decision of these
firms to list on AIM. First, small start-up companies found the U.S.
markets, particularly Nasdaq, to be less receptive to venture capitalistbacked firms following the burst of the dotcom bubble in March 2000.165
Additionally, critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act frequently point to the
concerns that small companies have regarding the costs of complying with
the federal securities laws in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.166 Other
costs, however, also affect these firms’ decisions to list in London. The
initial fee and the yearly fee for an AIM listing are both less than $7,500
each, while Nasdaq charges a minimum of $100,000 for the initial listing
fee and between $25,000 and $75,000 a year to maintain the listing.167
It is, however, worth noting that listing at a lower cost initially does not
ultimately result in monetary gain. Therefore, the U.S. markets may well
still have advantages over the foreign ones that, superficially, seem to be
challenging their competitiveness. Of the forty-six U.S. technology
companies that listed on AIM between 2001 and 2006, two-thirds of them

160. WORLD FED’N OF EXCHS., ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 28 (2006), available at
http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=413.
161. Id.
162. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, The Global Bet, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2007, at F1.
163. Id.
164. Move Away From New York a Natural Progression, INT’L FIN. R., Jan. 1, 2007.
165. Thomas Frostberg, AIM Grabbing NASDAQ Business, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 18,
2006, at D1.
166. See, e.g., id.
167. Id.
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lost money for their investors.168 A study conducted by Innovation
Advisors, a U.S. investment bank, compared technology companies with
$10 million or more in revenues that listed on AIM with those that listed on
Nasdaq.169 It found that after two years the companies on AIM had lost 57%
of their initial value on average while those on Nasdaq had gained 12%.170
In addition, companies on Nasdaq appear to be more highly valued than
those on AIM. Nasdaq companies are valued at an EBITDA multiple of
13.2 compared with an EBITDA multiple of 7.1 for companies listed on
AIM.171
One of the authors of the Innovation Advisors’ study concluded that the
tighter regulatory requirements in the United States is actually better for
investors, since it may mean that only stronger companies can list here.172
Critics of the Innovation Advisors’ study, however, point to the fact that
AIM and Nasdaq serve different markets, and that the companies listing on
AIM are smaller and earlier in their development than those that list on
Nasdaq.173 The hypothesis that these exchanges serve different markets may
also be borne out by the fact that some firms that initially listed on AIM
have later sought a listing on Nasdaq. For example, Ocean Power
Technologies, a New Jersey-based company, raised £22.4 million with a
listing on AIM in 2003.174 It, however, never made a profit and by 2006
needed to raise an additional $100 million.175 Rather than just doing a
secondary offering on AIM, Ocean Power Technologies decided to list its
shares on both Nasdaq and AIM.176
f. Companies Delisting and Listing
In addition to U.S. markets seeing a general decline in firms doing
initial listings on them, some evidence exists that firms that initially listed
in the U.S. seem to either be considering delisting or actually moving to
delist their shares. A survey of fifty-four European companies with shares

168. David Blackwell, Tighter U.S. Rules Help NASDAQ Technology Companies Seem to Age
Better in New York than on AIM, FIN. TIMES (Asia), Nov. 24, 2006, at 19.
169. Blackwell, supra note 168; Avital Louria Hahn, Research Shows AIM Misses Mark,
INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Aug. 14, 2006, at 10.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Blackwell, supra note 168.
173. See Nandini Sukumar & Edgar Ortega, Companies May Do Better on NASDAQ than LSE’s
AIM, Report Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.innovationadvisors.com/
pdf/AIM_Study.pdf ; Hahn, supra note 169.
174. Blackwell, supra note 168. In part, its decision to list on AIM was driven by the fact that it
had a UK subsidiary and wanted a higher profile in Europe for its buoys that harness wave power
to generate electricity. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. In its amended Form S-1, Ocean Power Technologies noted that its stock on AIM had
low trading volumes, which limited the liquidity of its stock in that market. Ocean Power
Technologies, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 22 (Apr. 23, 2007).
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listed on U.S. exchanges in 2006 found that 17% of them would consider
delisting.177 On June 4, 2007, the new SEC rules permitting deregistration
by foreign companies with relatively low trading volumes took effect.178
As a result of the new rules, the NYSE and Nasdaq saw an increase in
the number of foreign firms delisting in 2007.179 Nasdaq, however, did not
experience as sharp a rise in delistings as the NYSE experienced. It may be
due to the difference in the number of foreign firms listed on Nasdaq and
the NYSE. Nasdaq had only 312 foreign firms listed on it at the end of 2007
while the NYSE had 424 foreign firms listed on it at the end of 2007.
Alternatively, it may be that the lower listing costs for listing on Nasdaq
made foreign firms more willing to maintain their listings on Nasdaq.
Table 6: Number of Foreign Firms Delisting From NYSE,
Nasdaq and AMEX180
NYSE
Nasdaq (Regulatory)
Nasdaq (Voluntary)
Nasdaq (Total)
AMEX

2002
24
34
40
74
NA181

2003
22
17
27
44
8

2004
27
7
22
29
7

2005
26
9
34
43
7

2006
30
5
29
34
NA

2007
56
4
37
41
NA

177. Press Release, Mazars, Worldwide Survey on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Overall Companies
Ready (July 2006), available at http://www.mazars.com/pdf/pressrelease_sox.pdf.
178. Rule 12h-6 (2007); Form 15F (2007); Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s
Registration of a Class of Securities under Section 12(g) and Duty to File Reports under Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 55,540, 72 Fed.
Reg. 16,934 (Mar. 27, 2007).
179. Nasdaq, All Listing Information (2008), available at www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/stats/
documents/2008_Download.xls.
180. Id.; World Federation of Exchanges, Statistics/Annual webpage for listing and delisting
statistics for 1997 to 2006, http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?action=document&
menu=27 (last visited Apr. 22, 2008). It is unclear from the NYSE and AMEX data available from
the WFE how many of the foreign firms voluntarily delisted versus being required to delist for
failing to meet the regulatory requirements for listing. The NYSE changed its Rule 500, which
governs voluntary delistings, in 1999 and in 2003. In 1999, the SEC allowed the NYSE to change
Rule 500 from requiring approval of two-thirds of a company’s shareholders to approve a decision
to delist, to requiring approval of its board of directors, approval of its audit committee,
notification in writing of its thirty-five largest stockholders of record of its intention to delist from
the NYSE, and issuance of a press release. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD
Opposes SEC Approval of NYSE’s Anti-Competitive Amendment to Rule 500 (July 22, 1999),
available at www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/1999NewsReleases/P010305. In 2003, the
SEC approved the repeal of NYSE Rule 500 and allowed the NYSE to only require that a certified
board resolution approving delisting be provided to the NYSE in order for a corporation to
voluntarily delist. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,720, 68 Fed. Reg.
62,645 (Nov. 5, 2003). This change put the NYSE and Nasdaq on a more even footing as prior to
2003, Nasdaq had only required a notice from a company seeking to delist in for it to delist from
Nasdaq. Jeffery Harris, Why Rule 500 Should be Repealed, NASDAQ, Sept/Oct. 2003, at 54–55
Data for delistings by foreign firms on Nasdaq was not available for the period from 1997–2001.
It is also unclear from the delisting data how many of these firms actually deregistered as opposed
to switching their listing from one exchange to another. Not all firms that delist also deregister. If
the concern is that foreign firms are leaving the U.S. markets, then one needs to determine the
number of firms that have deregistered, not merely delisted.
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Outside economic factors may also play a role in delisting rates of
foreign firms. Both the NYSE and Nasdaq previously experienced a sharp
rise in the number of delistings by foreign firms when the dotcom bubble
burst. Even with the relaxed deregistration standards permitted by the SEC,
Nasdaq had more foreign firms voluntarily delist in 2002 than in 2007.182 In
fact, Nasdaq had more foreign firms forced to delist in 2002 for failing to
meet its listing standards than those voluntarily delisting.
Reduced listing and increased delisting of foreign firms in the U.S. may
also be explained in part by the fact that, in most cases, foreign firms have
derived few benefits from being listed on a U.S. exchange, because a very
small percentage of their shares, or American Depository Receipts
(ADRs),183 are traded in the United States. Intershop Communications AG,
a German technology company that deregistered in 2004, found that only
1% of its shares were being held as ADRs.184 Even a large foreign firm like
Daimler-Benz found that in the mid-1990s less than 5% of its shares were
held through ADRs traded in the United States.185 The remainder traded on
Deutsche Boerse.186
Some commentators have noted that U.S. stock exchanges offer two or
more tiers of benefits for companies listed on them.187 Large corporations
with stock that is widely followed by analysts and that has large trading
volumes reap substantial benefits from being listed.188 Small- and mediumsized firms with stock that lacks analyst coverage and that has low trading
volumes reap very few benefits from being listed.189 It may be that many
small-and medium-sized firms overestimated the benefits of being listed
during the stock market bubble of the late 1990s. These small- and mediumsized firms may have been encouraged to list by investment banks seeking
fees and by venture capitalists seeking a quick exit.190 The U.S. exchanges
experienced a significant rise in the number of foreign firms electing to list
in the United States during the 1990s. The increase in delisting might be
181. Not available.
182. Nasdaq, supra note 179; World Federation of Exchanges, supra note 180.
183. ADRs are the form in which shares of foreign companies are traded on U.S. markets. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 91 (8th ed. 2004).
184. See Stephen Taub, Sarbox: Spur to Foreign-Company Flight?, CFO.COM, Sept. 21, 2004,
http://cfo.com/article.cfm/3217608?f=search.
185. G. Andrew Karolyi, DaimlerChrysler AG, the First Truly Global Share, 9 J. CORP. FIN.
409, 417 (2003).
186. Id.
187. Frank K. Reilly & Eugene F. Drzycimski, An Analysis of the Effects of Multi-Tiered Stock
Market, 16 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 559 (1981); Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital
Market Losing Its Competitive Edge? (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working
Paper No. 192/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028701.
188. Zingales, supra note 187, at 35 tbl.2.
189. Id.
190. Gil Avnimelech, Martin Kenney & Morris Teubal, Building Venture Capital Industries:
Understanding the U.S. and Israeli Experiences 27 (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int’l Econ.,
Working Paper No. 160, 2004), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/brie/BRIEWP160.
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attributed to these firms’ delayed realization that the expected benefits of
their U.S. listings had not materialized and were unlikely to do so in the
future. Thus, all of the blame for the fact that these firms wanted to delist
should not be placed on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Foreign firms can become listed on a U.S. exchange without
undertaking an IPO. These firms gain the cross-listing benefits of having
their shares traded in the United States, even though they may become
listed through a secondary offering or other type of offering. In order to
judge the true demand to participate in the U.S. market, one needs to look at
total listings, not just IPOs. In fact, only about half of the foreign firms
listed on the NYSE became listed through an IPO.191 Below is a table
showing how many firms listed on the NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX without
undertaking an IPO.
Table 7: Number of Foreign Firms Listing on the NYSE,
Nasdaq and AMEX192
NYSE
Nasdaq
AMEX

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

63
75
13

43
50
8

28
61
7

60
119
4

51
21
5

33

16
3
16

20
23
20

19
23
34

28
21
10

NA

8

193

As is evident from this table, the number of foreign firms listing on the
three national exchanges in the United States fluctuated substantially even
before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The NYSE had the same
number of foreign firms listing on it in 1999, during the dotcom bubble, as
it did in 2006. Before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Nasdaq’s
foreign listings swung wildly from highs in 1997 and 2000 to lows in 1998
and 2001. In fact, the number of foreign firms listing on Nasdaq in 2006
was the same number that listed on Nasdaq in 2001. The nadir for foreign
listings on both the NYSE and Nasdaq was in 2003. Since then, the number
of foreign firms listing on these exchanges has been relatively constant. The
American Stock Exchange saw a decline in the number of foreign firms
listing on it from 1997 to 2001. The number of foreign firms listing on
AMEX increased noticeably from 2002 to 2005 and then dropped in 2006.
The percentage of the total firms listed on Nasdaq comprised by foreign
firms declined very slightly from 10.3% in 2002 to 10.0% in 2007. The
percentage of the total firms listed on NYSE comprised by foreign firms
declined noticeably from 20.0% in 2002 to 18.5% in 2007.
Finally, it is worth noting that the total number of firms listed on the
NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX had been declining for several years before the
191. See infra tbl.9.
192. Nasdaq, supra note 179; World Federation of Stock Exchanges, supra note 109.
193. Not available.
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passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The number of listed firms (both
domestic and foreign) peaked on Nasdaq at the end of 1996 when 5,556
firms were listed. By the end of 2002, the total number of firms listed on
Nasdaq had dropped to 3,649, a 34% decline from Nasdaq’s peak in 1996.
By the end of November 2007, Nasdaq had 3,134 firms listed on it.
The total number of firms listed on the NYSE peaked at the end of
1999, when 3,025 firms were listed on the exchange. By the end of 2002,
the total number of firms listed on NYSE had declined to 2,366. By the end
of 2006, the total number of firms listed on the NYSE was 2,280.
The American Stock Exchange saw the number of firms listed on it
decline from 824 in 1990 to 557 in 2003. Since 2003, AMEX has seen a
rise in the number of firms listed on it. By the end of 2006, the total number
of firms listed on AMEX was 592. Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act affects all
listed companies equally, one wonders what the AMEX has done that
Nasdaq and the NYSE have not done, which has led to the rise in the
number for firms listed on AMEX in recent years.
g. Cross-Listing Premiums
Several studies have attempted to address whether one can detect
problems with U.S. competitiveness by analyzing the premium received by
foreign companies cross listed on both a U.S. and a foreign exchange.194
One study by Kate Litvak found that the premium enjoyed by such
companies that were already high-disclosing or from high-disclosing
countries declined significantly in the wake of the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.195 The size of the premium may be declining because
the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act make a U.S. listing more
expensive, or because other nations are strengthening their own securities
regulation, or both. The Litvak study was not able to determine which of
these factors was responsible for the decline.196 However, this decrease in
premium could discourage similar companies from wanting to cross-list in
the United States in the future.197 The reduction in the cross-listing premium
provides evidence of a decline in U.S. competitiveness because
traditionally, companies from countries with weak institutional structures
and shareholder protections could reduce their cost of capital by crosslisting on a U.S. exchange.198 These benefits erode as other nations
strengthen their regulations or as the United States makes its regulations
significantly more expensive.

194. Davidoff, supra note 4; Hostak et. al., supra note 4; Litvak, supra note 4; Ribstein, supra
note 4.
195. Litvak, supra note 4, at 1897.
196. Id. at 1898.
197. Id. at 1860.
198. Id.
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Another preliminary study by Peter Hostak, Thomas Lys and George
Yang looked at the effect the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had on cross-listings and
the decision to delist.199 The study sought to determine if the delistings were
occurring because the extra compliance costs associated with the SarbanesOxley Act had negatively altered the cost-benefit trade-off associated with a
U.S. listing (the Compliance Cost Hypothesis) or because the stricter
governance standards under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduced the ability of
the firms’ managers or controlling shareholders to extract private benefits
from other shareholders and increase their litigation risks for engaging in
such behavior (the Agency Problem Hypothesis).200 This study concluded
that on average the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was driving away firms that had
poor corporate governance standards and that either did not want to
improve them or found it too costly to do so.201 If this conclusion is correct,
then the loss of this share of the market may be a necessary price to pay in
order to achieve other regulatory goals, such as investor protection.
Traditionally, the strong corporate governance regime employed by the
United States has enabled it to attract foreigners to list on its securities
markets who want to attract investors to whom they would otherwise be
unable to appeal because of the weak regulatory regimes in their home
countries.202 In recent years, a debate has raged over whether the SarbanesOxley Act and the regulations implemented in its wake have strengthened
the U.S. corporate governance regime or simply increased the costs for
publicly traded companies in the United States without improving their
corporate governance.203 The number of financial report restatements that
companies filed after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and the costs of
switching auditing firms has fueled this discussion.204
Proponents of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however, point to recent data
that indicate that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has improved financial reporting
and reduced corporate scandals, cases of fraud, and financial-reporting
issues.205 While the number of restatements increased each year from 2002
to 2006, peaking at 1,346 restatements filed in 2006, the number of
restatements filed declined 15% to 1,298 in 2007.206 In addition, the number
of companies reporting material weaknesses, which often result in
erroneous financial statements, continued to decline in 2007 to 1,161, down
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Hostak et al., supra note 4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 26–27.
Coffee, supra note 4, at 1765–66.
Litvak, supra note 4; Hostak et al., supra note 4; HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE (2006).
204. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005).
205. Hostak et al., supra note 4.
206. See Steven Marcy, Financial Restatements: Financial Restatements Reverse Trend by
Falling in 2007, Glass Lewis Reports, Corp. L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 28, 2008).
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12.1% from its peak of 1,322 in 2005.207 This decline appears to be linked
to compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Companies required to comply
with §404 of the Act experienced the largest declines in material
weaknesses, while the number of material weaknesses reported by microcap
companies, which are not subject to §404 yet, continued to increase.208
Section 404 also appears to have reduced the number of adverse internalcontrol opinions issued by external audit firms. The number of adverse
internal-control opinions has declined 43% since some companies had to
begin complying with §404 on November 15, 2004.209
Nevertheless, other nations, particularly the United Kingdom, pose
challenges to the U.S. leadership in the area of corporate governance. A
survey by Davis Global Advisors ranked the United States second, after the
United Kingdom.210 The survey found the United Kingdom to be marginally
better than the United States because of its shareholder-friendly
environment, which includes requirements that shareholders vote on board
remuneration, and the fact that a quarter of the companies in the FTSE 100
do not have the same individual serving as both the Chairman of the Board
and the Chief Executive Officer.211 Other nations, like Bermuda, Dubai,
Luxembourg, Singapore and Hong Kong, also are improving their financial
regulatory regimes and closing the gap between their regulatory standards
and U.S. standards.212
In the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s passage, the European Union
found it easier to adopt measures to strengthen its own regulatory
environment.213 For example, the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act made
it easier for the European Union to enact modernization directives that
national governments and the private sector had previously delayed,
including legislation addressing EU financial market supervision,
accounting oversight, and corporate governance standards.214 These
measures may have enhanced the perception that it is a solid alternative to
the U.S. market, as well as improved investors’ trust in these markets and
made investors more willing to invest in companies listed in these markets.

207.
208.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.
DAVIS GLOBAL ADVISORS, LEADING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 2002 (Nov.

2002).
211. Id. at 4.
212. See FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE REPORT, supra note 4, at 41. Former Senator Paul Sarbanes
has noted that other nations are adopting Sarbanes-Oxley-like innovations. Rachel McTague,
Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation: Officials Say Sarbanes-Oxley Act Restored Confidence in
Financial Statements, Corp. L. Daily (BNA) (Aug. 2, 2007).
213. Klaus C. Engelen, Preventing European “Enronitis”, INT’L ECONOMY, Summer 2004, at
40.
214. Id.
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2. Banking Markets
Banking is the most mature financial services market internationally.
Global growth for banking was only 6% in 2004.215 Nevertheless, the
growth of foreign banks’ assets in the United States grew by 77% from
1998 to 2005, significantly faster than the growth of all FDIC-insured
assets, which only grew at a rate of 67% during the same period.216
The United States’ banking sector remains relatively fragmented when
compared with the banking sectors of other developed nations. This
fragmentation results from the historic barriers that limited both the
financial sectors and geographic regions in which banks could operate.217
Those limitations were largely eliminated in the 1990s.218 As a result, the
United States has experienced a wave of banking mergers in the past decade
and will likely see additional consolidation within the banking industry in
the future.219
U.S. banks traditionally have faced a competitive disadvantage because
of the stricter capital adequacy requirements imposed by U.S. banking
regulators when compared with the regulations imposed by the counterparts
internationally. Basel I and Basel II both were designed to level the playing
field by establishing minimum international standards for capital
adequacy.220 Specifically, Basel II, which replaces Basel I in most nations,
attempts to implement a consistent international risk-based capital standard
for banking institutions.221 Unfortunately for U.S. banks, U.S. banking
regulators will only permit the very largest banks to implement the riskbased model proposed in Basel II.222 Other banks must still use Basel I or a
hybrid set of regulations referred to as Basel I-A.223 Even the largest banks,
however, would not always be able to apply the risk-based system. For
example, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the U.S. banking
regulators would require even the largest banks to maintain a leverage ratio
that would force them to hold more capital than required under the riskbased system of Basel II.224 These requirements would maintain the
competitive disadvantage of U.S. banks vis-à-vis their international
counterparts, who will be permitted to operate solely under Basel II.

215. U.S. International Trade Administration, Banking Sector 2007, http://trade.gov/
investamerica/banking.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2008).
216. Id.
217. Brown, supra note 4, at 12–16.
218. Id. at 19.
219. Id. at 15–16.
220. Id. at 46–49.
221. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 88.
222. Id. Other banks must still use Basel I or a hybrid set of regulations referred to as Basel I-A.
Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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3. Insurance Markets
The U.S. regulatory structure reduces competition within the United
States by erecting significant barriers to entry both for new American firms
and for foreign firms. This structure protects existing U.S. insurance
companies but harms consumers by limiting both their choices of products
and providers. The states regulate insurance within the United States.225
Each state within the United States requires that both insurance providers
and products be licensed before they can operate or be sold within the state.
These licensing procedures can be time consuming and costly. It can take
over two years to get a new product licensed in all fifty states within the
United States.226
The United States is not alone in imposing regulations that hinder
competition.227 Some OECD nations maintain statutory monopolies for
particular compulsory lines of insurance.228 Other nations severely limit
cross-border trade in insurance products. For example, Hungary does not
permit its citizens to sign insurance contracts with foreign nationals.229
Liberalization of trade in insurance services is tied to the ability of
nations to establish common minimum standards in order to prevent trade in
insurance services from undermining the goals of domestic regulation. The
U.S. structure for insurance regulation, however, has severely hampered the
United States’ ability to negotiate with other nations on insurance issues.
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) conducts international trade
negotiations on behalf of the United States. The USTR, however, has no
ability to make binding commitments to change the laws or regulations
governing insurance that the fifty states have adopted.230 The National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) frequently acts as a proxy
for the fifty states in international negotiations. The NAIC, however, also
does not have the power to make binding commitments on behalf of the
state governments.231 As a result, other nations find it extremely difficult to
negotiate with the United States on insurance issues. Lack of progress in

225. Insurance generally may be broken down into four categories: life, health, property and
casualty, and reinsurance. The amount of regulation and competition in each category varies
greatly. In addition, some of insurance products compete directly with other financial services
products offered by banks or securities firms.
226. Ruth Gastel, Optional Federal Charter, Insurance Information Institute Insurance Issues
Update (Aug. 2003); Insurance Product Approval: The Need for Modernization: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm.
on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 1 (2001) (remarks of Rep. Richard H. Baker).
227. Competition and Related Regulatory Issues in the Insurance Industry, OECD J.
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y, Vol.3/No.3, 2001, at 67 [hereinafter Competition and Related
Regulatory Issues].
228. Id. at 70.
229. Id. at 71.
230. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra note 31, at 5.
231. Id.

410

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 2

negotiating more liberal international insurance regulations has hampered
international competition, which in turn has harmed U.S. companies.
Some regions have liberalized trade in insurance products. For example,
the European Union’s passport system, which allows a financial service
provider licensed in one nation to operate in any other member state, is
increasing competition within the European Union.232 In light of this new
passport system, the United States’ regulatory regime does seem to be
producing a less competitive market for insurance when compared to the
European Union. Efforts have grown in the past decade to create an
American equivalent of this passport regime by creating a federal charter
for insurance.233 Nevertheless, these efforts face stiff opposition from some
U.S. insurance companies that currently benefit from the protection of the
current regime and from state regulators. As a result, the proposals to create
a federal charter for insurance have stalled in Congress.
B. MARKETS IN WHICH U.S. FIRMS ARE NOT LOSING MARKET
SHARE
The financial services firms from the United States continue to lead the
world in many areas of financial services, including many aspects of the
securities sector. The United States has more financial stock (equities,
private debt, government debt and bank deposits) than any other area of the
world. In 2005, the United States had $51 trillion in financial stock, which
was 34% more than Europe, 190% more than Japan, and 346% more than
the total held by Asian-Pacific nations other than Japan.234
1. Largest Financial Services Firms
In 2006, four of the top ten of the largest financial services firms by
revenues were American, up from only three in 2001.235

232. Competition and Related Regulatory Issues, supra note 227, at 70.
233. The National Insurance Act that proposed creating an optional federal charter for insurance
was first introduced into Congress as the National Insurance Act of 2006, S. 2509, 109th Cong.,
2d Sess. (April 5, 2006). Senators John Sununu (R-NH) and Tim Johnson (D-SD) co-sponsored
this bill. A companion bill that is virtually identical to this bill was introduced into the House of
Representatives by Rep. Edward Royce (R-Cal). The National Insurance Act was reintroduced to
Congress as the National Insurance Act of 2007, S. 40, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 24, 2007) and
by Rep. Royce and Rep. Melissa Bean (D-Ill) as H.R. 3200, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 25,
2007). The major change between the National Insurance Act of 2006 and that of 2007 is that the
2007 bill makes clear that health insurance is included among the types of insurance that can
receive a federal charter. For purposes of this article, NIA will refer to the language in S. 40.
234. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 9–10.
235. INS. INFORMATION INST., FINANCIAL SERVICES 2002, at 144 (2002) [hereinafter
FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2002]; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21.
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Table 8: World’s Largest Financial Services Firms by
Revenue236
2001
1

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

General

General

General

General

General

Electric (US)

Electric (US)

Electric (US)

Electric (US)

Electric (US)

2

Citigroup

AXA (France)

Allianz

AXA (France) ING

3

Allianz

(US)

(Germany)

4

Group

(Netherlands)

AXA (France) Citigroup

(Germany)
Group ING

Electric (US)

Group ING

(Netherlands)

Citigroup (US) AXA (France) Allianz

(Germany)

General

ING Group

ING

(Netherland

(Netherlands)

(Netherlands)

Group Citigroup
(US)

Deutsche

American

Citigroup

ING

Bank

International

(US)

(Netherlands)

(US)
Allianz

AXA (France)

(Germany)

s)
5

6

(Germany)

Group (US)

AXA

AXA (France)

(France)
7

8

9

Agricole

Netherlands)

(France)

American

American

Credit

Allianz

International

International

Agricole

(Germany)

Group (US)

Group (US)

(France)

Assicurazion

Assicurazioni

American

Nippon

(Switzerland

Insurance

i

)

(Japan)

(Italy)

Nippon Life

Assicurazioni

Berkshire

Fortis

Assicurazioni

Bank

Insurance

Generali

Hathaway

(Belgium/

Generali

America

(US)

Netherlands)

(Italy)

Corp. (US)

Berkshire

HSBC

HSBC

(Japan)

(Italy)
Fannie

International

(US)

May

Group (US)
10

Credit

(Belgium/

Credit Suisse

American

Life

Group Fortis

BNP Paribus

Deutsche Bank

(France)

(UK)

Generali Generali (Italy) International

Nippon Life

Group (US)

Fortis
(Belgium/
Netherlands)

Insurance

Hathaway

Holdings

Holdings

(Japan)

(US)

(UK)

(UK)

Aviva (UK)

Aviva (UK)

Aviva (UK)

American

of

International
Group (US)

Most of the top ten financial firms predominately focus on either
banking or insurance even though they are engaged in a wider array of
products and services. Only one, General Electric, is classified as a
diversified financial firm. The top four out of the top five global diversified

236. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2002, supra note 238 at 144; INS. INFORMATION INST.,
FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, at 159 (2003) [hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT
BOOK 2003]; INS. INFORMATION INST., FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2004, at 177 (2004)
[hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2004]; INS. INFORMATION INST., FINANCIAL
SERVICES FACT BOOK 2005, at 159 (2005) [hereinafter FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2005];
INS. INFORMATION INS., FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2006, at 177 (2006) [hereinafter
FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2006]; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21,
at World Rankings.
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financial firms were American in 2006.237 These firms included General
Electric, Freddie Mac, American Express, and Countrywide Financial.
The number of domestic financial holding companies in the United
States has fluctuated between 2002 and 2006 as more companies have opted
to become financial holding companies while others have merged. The
number of foreign companies choosing to operate as financial holding
companies in the United States has grown steadily during the period from
2002 to 2006.
Table 9: Financial Holding Companies in the United States238
Domestic
Foreign

2002
602
30

2003
612
32

2004
600
36

2005
591
38

2006
599
44

The size of U.S. financial institutions and the number of financial
conglomerates in the United States reflects two trends within the United
States: (1) the increasing concentration of financial markets as fewer
companies control ever larger shares within these markets and (2) the wave
of mergers of financial firms in the past two decades as deregulation
permitted firms to engage in wider range of activities. The number of
financial services firms participating in the U.S. financial markets has
declined steadily since World War I and this trend is likely to continue.239
While the total number of domestic insurers in the United States has
fluctuated, as evidenced by Table 10 below, the numbers of life insurance
companies, property/casualty insurance companies, and health insurance
companies have declined steadily over the years. The number of domestic
life insurance companies, which was 1,615 in 1999, dropped 22% to 1,257
by 2006.240 The number of domestic property/casualty insurance
companies, which was 3,405 in 1999, also declined by 22% to 2,648 by
2006.241 The number of domestic health insurance companies, which was

237. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at 144; FINANCIAL SERVICES
FACT BOOK 2004, supra note 236, at 155; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2005, supra note
236, at 159; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2006, supra note 236, at 177; FINANCIAL
SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21.
238. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21
239. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at 1–2. Before World War I, the
United States had approximately 25,000 commercial banks and by 2006, the number had dropped
to 7401. Id. at 1; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at Banking: Commercial
Banks.
240. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT 1999, at 40
(2000) [hereinafter 1999 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT]; NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’RS, INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT 2006, at 47 (2007) [hereinafter 2006
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT].
241. 1999 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT, supra note 243; 2006 INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT, supra note 243.
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943 in 1999, declined by about 15% to 804 by 2006.242 The periodic
increases in the number of insurance companies are due to increase in
companies that provide miscellaneous forms of insurance that do not fit
within the traditional insurance categories.
Table 10: Number of Domestic Insurers in the United States243
9000

8500

8000

7500

7000

6500

6000
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

20002

2003

2004

2005

2006

In addition, the asset share of the major financial services sectors
captured by the top ten companies in those sectors has grown over time,
except in the case of securities.
Table 11: Asset Share of Top Ten Companies in the Major
Financial Services Sectors244
Banks
Savings Institutions
Securities Firms
Life Insurance Firms
Property/casualty insurance firms

1995
34
21
60
34
30

2001
40
38
53
44
45

242. 1999 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT, supra note 243; 2006 INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT, supra note 243.
243. NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT 1992, at 35
(1994); 1999 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT, supra note 243, at 38; 2002
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT, 38 (2000) [hereinafter 2002 INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT]; 2006 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCE REPORT, supra
note 243, at 46.
244. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at VII.
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Over the past two decades regulatory reforms within the United States
eliminated laws and regulations that had restricted the affiliations among
banks, insurance companies and securities firms; prohibited the sale of
certain products or services by banks; and limited the geographic area in
which banks could operate. These reforms spurred mergers among financial
firms. The number of mergers spiked in 1998 immediately before the
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.245
Table 12: Value of Announced Mergers of Financial Services
Firms246
450.0

400.0

350.0

300.0

250.0

200.0

150.0

100.0

50.0

0.0
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2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

After accounting for the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2001 and the
recession in 2002, both the number and value of financial services mergers
remained relatively constant in recent years.

245. See infra tbl.14.
246. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at 2; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT
BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at Financial Services Industry: Mergers.
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Table 13: Total Number of Announced Financial Services
Mergers247
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Certainly, these mergers have increased the size of U.S. financial
institutions and allowed them to compete with conglomerates from other
nations. While this may be good for the competitive position of the United
States vis-à-vis the rest of the world in financial services, it is not clear that
these larger institutions are entirely positive for the financial system.
Specifically, consumers may be disadvantaged by the reduction in choice as
the number of banks or of insurance companies declines. Larger institutions
may be less responsive to consumers’ concerns and problems than smaller,
more local institutions. The immense size of these institutions means that if
even one of them should fail, it could bankrupt the taxpayer-backed deposit
insurance fund. Since many of these institutions extend well beyond
banking, they are putting pressure on the United States government to bail
them out rather than allow them to go under, even if the cause of their
failure is due to excessive speculation by the traders of their investment
banking subsidiaries or underwriting mismanagement by their insurance
subsidiary. The bailout of the investment bank Bear Stearns by the Federal
Reserve illustrates the problem of financial conglomerates and firms that
are “too big to fail.”248 Even though four of the world’s largest financial
services firms are U.S. firms, providing evidence of the global
247. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at 2; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT
BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at Financial Services Industry: Mergers.
248. James Surowiecki, The Financial Page: Too Dumb to Fail, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 31,
2008, at 46.
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competitiveness of these firms, U.S. policymakers should temper their
judgments about the value of this competitiveness against the potential
costs that these firms pose to U.S. consumers and the U.S. government.
2. Banking Markets
After suffering significant declines in market share in the 1970s and
1980s, the largest U.S. banks reinvented themselves as universal banks and
recaptured market share in the 1990s and 2000s. U.S. banks have come to
dominate traditional bank lending. Citigroup, Bank of America and
JPMorganChase were in the top ten global commercial and savings banks
by revenues in 2006.249 JPMorganChase, Citigroup and Bank of America
were responsible for 50% of all global lending and comprised over 70% of
the global loan book of the world’s ten largest banks in 2004.250 Retail
banking still tends to be a local or regional phenomenon due primarily to
government regulations. Nevertheless, some U.S. banking institutions have
staked out significant global positions in certain product lines, like credit
cards. Visa and American Express have global presences in part because of
their willingness to undertake joint ventures with foreign institutions.251
3. Insurance Markets
More global insurance companies in most insurance sectors are from
the United States than from any other nation. Three of the top ten insurance
companies and five of the top ten property and causality insurers were
American in 2006. Three of the top-ten reinsurers were American in
2006.252 In 2006, eight of the top ten insurance brokers by revenues were
American, up from seven in 2004. Three of the top ten reinsurance firms
were American in 2006.253 Four of the top ten reinsurance brokers by
revenue were American in 2006, including the largest reinsurance broker,
Aon Re.254 The remaining reinsurance brokers in the top ten were all from
the United Kingdom.
Only one of the top ten life/health insurance companies, however, was
American.255 Two of the top ten life/health insurance companies came from
each of the Netherlands, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

249. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at 2; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT
BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at Financial Services Industry: Mergers.
250. Lawrence Franko, U.S. Competitiveness in the Global Financial Services Industry 7 (Univ.
Mass. Boston College of Mgmt. Fin. Servs. Forum, Working Paper No. 1001, 2004), available at
http://www.financialforum.umb.edu/documents/Franko%20Fin%20Svcs%20Global%20Comp.pdf
251. Id. at 3.
252. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at World Rankings.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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4. Securities Markets
Even in the area of securities, the United States still leads the world in
many aspects. Foreign markets, particularly in Europe, are more mature and
offer greater liquidity than they did twenty-five or thirty years ago. Even so,
these markets still cannot match the size and liquidity of the securities
markets in the United States. One quarter of the world’s capital is invested
in the United States but only 6% of it is invested in the United Kingdom.256
According to the World Federation of Exchanges, the world’s ten largest
stock markets by total value of share trades in 2006 were:257
1) New York Stock Exchange (NYSE): $21.79 trillion
2) Nasdaq Stock Market: $11.81 trillion
3) London Stock Exchange: $7.57 trillion
4) Tokyo Stock Exchange: $5.82 trillion
5) Euronext: $3.85 trillion
6) Deutsche Boerse: $2.74 trillion
7) BME Spanish Exchanges: $1.93 trillion
8) Borsa Italiana: $1.59 trillion
9) Swiss Exchange: $1.40 trillion
10) Korea Stock Exchange: $1.34 trillion
In addition, U.S. investment banks continue to dominate the world. During
the period from 2001 to 2006, the four largest investment banks were all
American. 258 These banks operate globally and have significant operations
in each of the world’s major financial markets.259

256. PCAOB Board Member Disputes Reports that Sarbanes-Oxley Has Hurt U.S. Markets,
Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (June 4, 2007).
257. Edward Hadas & Robert Cyran, Euronext, a U.S. Retreat?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2007, at
C12. This data was compiled before the merger of the New York Stock Exchange with Euronext.
In the wake of that merger, the NYSE is less concerned about attracting foreign listings to New
York as long as it can attract them to Euronext and away from London. Id. Figures are in trillions
of U.S. dollars.
258. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at 142; FINANCIAL SERVICES
FACT BOOK 2004, supra note 236, at 158; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2005, supra note
236, at 162; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2006, supra note 236, at 182; FINANCIAL
SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at World Rankings.
259. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at 142; FINANCIAL SERVICES
FACT BOOK 2004, supra note 236, at 158; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2005, supra note
236, at 162; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2006, supra note 236, at 182; FINANCIAL
SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at World Rankings.
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Table 14: World’s Top Four Investment Banks260
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1 Morgan

Morgan

Morgan

Morgan

Morgan

Morgan

Stanley

Stanley

Stanley

Stanley

Stanley

Stanley

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

2 Merrill

Merrill

Merrill

Merrill

Merrill

Merrill

Lynch

Lynch

Lynch

Lynch

Lynch

Lynch

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

Goldman

Goldman

Goldman

Goldman

Goldman

Sachs

Sachs

Sachs

Sachs

Sachs

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

4 Lehman

Lehman

Lehman

Lehman

Lehman

Lehman

Brothers

Brothers

Brothers

Brothers

Brothers

Brothers

Holdings

Holdings

Holdings

Holdings

Holdings

Holdings

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

(U.S.)

3 Goldman
Sachs (U.S.)

The United States also dominates the $8.06 trillion securitization
market, controlling approximately 83% of the global issuance by value and
87% of revenues in 2005.261 Thus, even if one only looks at the securities
and investment banking industry the evidence is mixed regarding the extent
to which the United States has lost its competitive edge.
5. Assets Under Management
The stocks floated on U.S. exchanges or sold through private
placements need buyers. These buyers usually are pension funds, mutual
funds, or private bankers for high net worth individuals. As a result, many
investment banks and universal banks in the United States have significant
asset-management businesses. These businesses are competitive
internationally. Although the largest asset manager was a UK firm
(Barclays Global Investors), seven of the top ten asset managers were
American companies, including the second-, third-, fourth- and fifth-largest
asset managers by revenue in 2005.262
Although precise measurements for the amount of foreign money
managed by U.S. institutions in the United States and by foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. institutions abroad are difficult to come by, anecdotal
260. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2002, supra note 235, at 142; FINANCIAL SERVICES
FACT BOOK 2003, supra note 236, at 158; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2004, supra note
236, at 162; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2005, supra note 236, at 162; FINANCIAL
SERVICES FACT BOOK 2006, supra note 236, at 182; FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008,
supra note 21, at World Rankings.
261. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
262. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at World Rankings.
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evidence suggests that foreign holdings of U.S. securities are substantial,263
and at least some of these holdings are accounted for by the assets under
management listed by U.S. institutions and their subsidiaries.264
Table 15: Foreign holdings of U.S. securities, by type of
security, as of recent survey dates 265 (billions of U.S.
dollars)
Type of Security

June 30, 2005

June 30, 2006

Long-term Securities
Equity
Long-term debt
Asset-backed
Other

6,262
2,144
4,118
717
3,401

7,162
2,430
4,733
980
3,753

Short-term debt securities

602

Total
Of which: Official

6,864
1,938

615
7,778
2,301

6. Private Equity and Venture Capital
U.S. firms dominate the private equity field. In 2006 seven of the ten
largest private equity firms by revenue are American, including all five of
the top five firms.266 Venture capital is a sub-category of private equity.
U.S. firms also are leaders in that area as well. Venture capitalists made
significant investments in businesses in twenty-one countries in 2006. In
2006, they undertook 3,560 deals with a total value of nearly $26.3
billion.267 In Europe that year, venture capitalists did only 867 venture
capital deals with a total value of €4.12 billion (about $5.43 billion), or only
about 20% of the value of American deals in 2006.268
263. See infra tbl.16.
264. Franko, supra note 250, at 9.
265. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Report on Foreign Holdings of U.S. Securities at
End June 2006 (May 31, 2007), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp437.htm.
Figures are in billions of U.S. dollars. The amount listed as “official” refers to the amount held by
foreign governments.
266. FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 21, at World Rankings.
267. National Venture Capital Association, Industry Statistics, http://www.nvca.org/ffax.html
(last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
268. Press Release, Ernst & Young, Venture Capital Investment in Europe Climbs to €4.12
Billion in 2006, Highest Amount in Four Years (Feb. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/International/Media_-_Press_Release_-_VentureOneQ406.

420

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 2

In a 2006 survey of venture capitalists from around the world, over half
of U.S. and non-U.S. venture capitalists were considering expanding their
operations globally.269 U.S. venture capitalists are primarily interested in
China and India.270 European venture capitalists were most interested in
investing in Central and Eastern Europe while Asian-Pacific venture
capitalists were most interested in investing in the United States and
China.271 Less than 2% of the U.S. and non-U.S. venture capitalists
considered the U.S. regulatory environment a major impediment to making
further investments in the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the United States has not yet lost its competitive edge in many
areas of financial services, this does not mean that U.S. regulators should be
complacent that the U.S. regulatory structure will not harm the
competitiveness of the U.S. financial industry in the future. The unwieldy
nature of the over 115 different financial regulators in the United States
raises significant concerns about their ability to address risks to the
financial system proactively in the future. Other nations have found that, by
employing a single regulator or a consolidated regulatory structure, they can
create regulatory environments that are comparable to or better than the
United States’ at a lower cost and with a greater level of predictability in
terms of enforcement and litigation risks for businesses. While the United
States may not be facing an immediate crisis regarding the competitiveness
of its financial services industry, this does not mean that there are not other
compelling reasons for the United States to begin to consolidate its financial
regulators.

269. DELOITTE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN VENTURE CAPITAL 2006 SURVEY 3 (2006), available at
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/2006%20Venture%20Capital%20Report.pdf.
270. Id. at 4.
271. Id. at 9.

